


PN-AAJ-611  
ISN-1939

A.I.D. Program Evaluation Discussion Paper No. 11

# **Effective Institution Building**

## **A Guide for Project Designers and Project Managers Based on Lessons Learned from the AID Portfolio**



March 1982

U.S. Agency for International Development (AID)

PN-AAJ-611

EFFECTIVE INSTITUTION BUILDING

A Guide for Project Designers and Project Managers  
Based on Lessons Learned from the AID Portfolio

by

BARNETT & ENGEL

\*\*\*\*

Stanley A. Barnett  
Nat Engel

A.I.D. Program Evaluation  
Discussion Paper No. 11

Office of Evaluation  
Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination  
U.S. Agency for International Development

March, 1982

This report was prepared under AID Contract No. AID/SOD/PDC-C-0393. The views and interpretations expressed in the report are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Agency for International Development.

7

### A.I.D. EVALUATION PUBLICATIONS

A complete list of reports issued in the A.I.D. Evaluation Publication series is included in the last three pages of this document, together with information for ordering reports.

## INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Self-reliant institutions, organizations, markets and other support systems are essential building blocks of societies that seek to promote and sustain development. Effective Institution Building: A Guide for Project Designers and Project Managers Based on Lessons Learned from the AID Portfolio is being published at a time when AID's interest in institutional capacity and the effectiveness of organizations in promoting self-sustained development is high. The AID Administrator's decision to assign a high priority to institution building within the framework of development initiatives in key sectors, such as agriculture, should trigger a re-examination of the efficiency and effectiveness of projects which seek to strengthen or build institutions. The practical guidance offered by this volume, which is drawn from AID's past experience, is designed to support AID's renewed emphasis on this important aspect of development.

The Guide was prepared based on an examination of Agency evaluations and audits. The focus of the majority of these documents is on the quality of project implementation efforts and the ways in which project development can positively or negatively affect the implementation process. Thus, the Guide itself tends to be oriented toward project development and project implementation concerns, as opposed to impact measurement and prediction. To understand fully the impact of institution building projects, as well as the optimum ways of designing and managing them, one needs to examine the Guide in conjunction with AID Impact Evaluations of projects in particular sectors and countries.

The analysis of the patterns in AID's portfolio of institution building projects presented in Part I of this volume will provide Agency managers with an overview of AID's investments in this important area over the past decades. While we believe that the

projects examined are representative of the Agency's experience, we are aware that some elements of this experience may not be fully reflected in the analysis. For example, during the 1970s, AID supported a number of integrated rural development projects that involved micro-level institution building efforts; these may not have been captured fully in the research because this component was simply not recognized as such or was inadequately defined in the documentation reviewed.

The checklist, in Part II of the Guide, draws on the lessons of experience to remind project designers and project managers of particular factors they need to consider as projects are developed and implemented. As a "stand-alone" design and management aid, we anticipate that the checklist presented in Part II may prove to be a useful device for training development personnel and for those who review project proposals, particularly for their soundness. Over time, AID's Impact Evaluations will be able to provide additional information on the questions of the sustainability and impact of the institution building projects to supplement the evaluative materials reviewed by this volume.

Office of Evaluation  
Bureau for Program and Policy  
Coordination

## C O N T E N T S

Index to Figures. . . . .	iii
List of Abbreviations . . . . .	iii
Acknowledgements. . . . .	iv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . .	v
Introduction. . . . .	v
Major Findings and Conclusions. . . . .	vi
Patterns in Project Design . . . . .	vi
Patterns in Project Success and Failure. . . . .	vii
Checklist of Lessons Learned . . . . .	x
Institution-Building Models and Approaches . . . . .	xi
 <u>PART I: PATTERNS IN AID'S INSTITUTION BUILDING PORTFOLIO</u>	
A. PATTERN ANALYSIS OF PROJECT DESIGNS . . . . .	I-1
Pattern by Geographic Bureau . . . . .	I-1
Pattern by Type of Institutional Change Anticipated. . . . .	I-2
Relationship to/among Target Institution(s). . . . .	I-2
Target Institution(s) by Functional Sector . . . . .	I-3
Public-or Private-Sector Target Institutions . . . . .	I-5
Political/Geographic Level of Target Institution(s). . . . .	I-6
 B. PATTERN ANALYSIS OF EVALUATIVE ASSESSMENTS. . . . .	I-8
Pattern of Evaluative Documents by Bureau. . . . .	I-8
Age Analysis of Evaluated and Audited Projects . . . . .	I-9
Pattern by Key Project Cluster and Geographic Bureau . . . . .	I-9
Project Assessments by Cluster . . . . .	I-11
Project Assessments by Geographic Bureau . . . . .	I-13
Assessments of Public versus Private Projects. . . . .	I-14
Assessments of National versus Sub-National Projects . . . . .	I-15
Project Pattern by Size of Estimated Budget. . . . .	I-16
Sizes of Public and Private Projects . . . . .	I-17
Sizes of National and Sub-National Projects. . . . .	I-17
 C. QUANTITATIVE BREAKDOWN OF EVALUATIVE REPORT FINDINGS. . . . .	I-19
Quantitative Breakdown of Evaluative Report Findings by Factor. . . . .	I-20
Analysis of Negative Citations by Type of Target Entity. . . . .	I-25

**PART II: INSTITUTION BUILDING CHECKLIST**  
**FOR PROJECT DESIGNERS AND MANAGERS**

Summary of Key Lessons Learned. . . . .	II-1
A Checklist for Project Designers and Managers. . . . .	II-3
Program Planning Factors . . . . .	II-5
Pre-Design Studies. . . . .	II-5
Overall Design Guidelines . . . . .	II-6
Realistic Time Frames . . . . .	II-8
Lines of Authority. . . . .	II-8
Clarifying Project Roles. . . . .	II-9
Host Country Factors . . . . .	II-9
Commitment of the Host Government . . . . .	II-9
Host Country Counterpart Agency . . . . .	II-10
Host Country Personnel. . . . .	II-11
Host Government Bureaucratic Process. . . . .	II-11
Project Inputs . . . . .	II-12
Financial Inputs. . . . .	II-12
Commodity Inputs. . . . .	II-13
Personnel Inputs. . . . .	II-14
Training, Including Participant Training . . . . .	II-15
The Target Institution . . . . .	II-17
Management. . . . .	II-17
Personnel Retention . . . . .	II-17
Indigenization. . . . .	II-17
Legal Status and Local Laws . . . . .	II-19
Special Situations . . . . .	II-19
Private Entities. . . . .	II-19
Projects with Construction Elements . . . . .	II-21
Isolated Project Sites. . . . .	II-22
Study-Oriented Projects . . . . .	II-22
Program Delivery . . . . .	II-22
Implementation by AID . . . . .	II-23
Implementation by the Contractor. . . . .	II-25
Implementation by the Target Institution. . . . .	II-26
Implementation by the Host Government . . . . .	II-27
Delivery of Inputs . . . . .	II-28
Commodity Inputs. . . . .	II-28
Financial Inputs. . . . .	II-29
Local Logistical Support. . . . .	II-29
Personnel Inputs. . . . .	II-30

**APPENDICES**

A. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY . . . . .	A-1
B. INSTITUTION-BUILDING MODELS AND APPROACHES . . . . .	A-6
AID Institutional Development Activity. . . . .	A-6
The Esman Institution-Building Model. . . . .	A-7

Why Has the Esman Model Vanished? . . . . .	A-8
More Recent Approaches to Project Design & Evaluation . . . . .	A-11
C. RELEVANCE OF AID DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE REVIEWS OF THREE COUNTRY PROGRAMS. . . . .	A-15
D. LIST OF 159 INSTITUTION-BUILDING PROJECTS IN THE FIVE KEY CLUSTERS . . . . .	A-17
E. BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	A-21

## INDEX TO FIGURES

1. Institution-Building Projects by Geographic Bureau . . .	I-1
2. Projects by Type of Institutional Change Anticipated . .	I-2
3. Relationship to/among Target Institutions. . . . .	I-3
4. Target Institutions by Functional Sector . . . . .	I-4
5. Breakdown by Public and Private Target Institutions. . .	I-5
6. Breakdown by Level of Target Institutions. . . . .	I-6
7. Projects Evaluated and Audited, by Geographic Bureau . .	I-8
8. Projects Evaluated and Audited, by Initial Fiscal Year and Geographic Bureau . . . . .	I-9
9. Evaluated and Audited Projects, by Key Institution-Building Cluster and Geographic Bureau. .	I-10
10. Overall Assessments of Institution-Building Projects, by Key Cluster. . . . .	I-12
11. Assessments of Institution-Building Projects, by Geographic Bureau. . . . .	I-13
12. Assessments of Public vs. Private Projects . . . . .	I-14
13. Assessments of National vs. Sub-National Projects. . . .	I-15
14. Estimated Budget Totals, by Key Cluster and Nature of Assessment . . . . .	I-16
15. Sizes of Projects Targeting Public and Private Institutions . . . . .	I-17
16. Sizes of Projects Focusing on National and Sub-National Institutions. . . . .	I-18

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFR - Bureau for Africa/AID.  
 AFR/DP/PPE - Policy Planning, Evaluation and Economic Analysis  
 Division, Office of Development Planning/AFR.  
 AID - Agency for International Development.



DIS - DS/DIU's computerized Development Information System.  
 DS/DIU - Office of Development Information and Utilization,  
           Bureau for Development Support/AID.  
 LAC - Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean/AID.  
 MUCIA - Midwest Universities Consortium  
           for International Studies.  
 NE - Bureau for Near East/AID.  
 PID - Project Identification Document, initial formal docu-  
       ment in the AID program design process.  
 PP - Project Paper, an internal AID project design document  
       that follows the PID.  
 PPC/E/PES - Program Evaluation Systems Division, Office of Evalua-  
           tion, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination/AID.  
 PPC/PDPR - Office of Policy Development & Program Review, Bureau  
           for Program and Policy Coordination/AID.  
 PROAG - Project Agreement, document of agreement between AID  
           and the host government.  
 PVO - Private and/or Voluntary Organization.  
 TAB - Bureau for Technical Assistance/AID (now defunct).

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Our study efforts were expedited and logisti-  
 cally supported by staff members of PPC/E/PES  
 and DS/DIU. To them, we express our apprecia-  
 tion. Of particular help were Molly Hageboeck,  
 who contributed ideas, insights and a sense of  
 excitement to our research; and our project  
 manager, Robert Thompson, who opened doors and  
 otherwise paved our way.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### INTRODUCTION

Self-sustaining growth in the developing nations depends on the ability of countries to introduce changes, through their public and private sectors, that lead to improvements in productivity and higher standards of living for large numbers of people. At times, important changes can be affected through a single action, such as a shift in pricing policies. More often, however, significant changes in developing countries require a series of actions which can be best fostered and maintained when an organizational infrastructure is set in place to efficiently and effectively introduce improvements, sustain their momentum and create the conditions that lead to desired results. Whether these changes are instituted through a nation's public health service or by private medical practitioners, through government marketing boards or private cooperatives, institutional capacity lies at the heart of long-term improvement efforts.

AID has long recognized the need to build human and organizational capacity in the developing countries. As part of its projects and programs over the past decades, the Agency has often made "institution building" an explicit objective. Even more frequently, a concern with institutional development is implicit in the way AID and host governments design and manage development projects and programs. During this same period, AID has also undertaken several exercises aimed at developing a theoretical framework for its institution-building efforts and has advanced guidance materials to its Missions based on those concepts.

While extensive efforts have been made to incorporate institution-building elements into AID projects in virtually every sector, the Agency has made no systematic attempt to review the effectiveness of its components of projects that are primarily concerned with providing goods and services. Thus, as the designers of new projects and the managers of ongoing AID-funded institution-building projects seek guidance, they find many titles and projects which are coded "institution building," but little organized information or practical, experience-based guidance.

The objective of this study has been to elicit useful findings and practical guidance concerning "institution building" from more than ten years' worth of AID project design documents, evaluations and audits, and from the theoretical work AID has undertaken in this field.

In the course of the study, 905 AID projects were identified that AID has explicitly coded "institution building" in its automated data base.\* These projects represent over 30% of the entire AID portfolio covered by the data base. Of the 905 projects coded "institution building," 659 were determined to be "field projects" designed and managed by AID's four geographic bureaus. The focus of the detailed investigation of project designs, evaluations and audits examined in the course of the study was on these "field projects."

## MAJOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

### Patterns in Project Design

AID-funded institution-building projects in the developing countries were found to cluster in several important ways. Overwhelmingly, AID's portfolio of institution-building projects has concentrated on existing entities, rather than on the creation of new organizations. Eighty-two percent of the field projects aim at strengthening institutions that pre-existed AID involvement. The strengthening of existing institutions has taken two basic forms: in roughly 75% of the Agency's projects where "strengthening" an institution is a basic project objective, the term is used to connote improvement in the functions the organization already performs. In the remaining 25% of these institution strengthening projects, AID has been involved in efforts to add new functions to existing entities.

The institutions AID has assisted also cluster into patterns. In 56% of the field projects, AID assistance has gone to a single organization. In the other 44% of these projects, the portfolio is distributed in a relatively even way among efforts that focus on: several related institutions; different types of organizations that work together; and different types of organizations that are not associated in a meaningful way (e.g., diverse, unrelated farmer groups and municipalities within a geographic area, not necessarily tied by common needs, objectives or markets). The organizations AID has assisted have been largely public institutions. Yet a significant 18% of the field projects were found to be targeted at private entities, e.g., cooperatives, farmer associations, local private voluntary organizations, banks and labor unions.

---

\* Projects covered by AID's automated project data base, the Development Information Service (DIS), include all projects extant on or after September 1974. Some projects in the data base have start dates earlier than 1974; the majority were begun in the 1970s.

The majority of all institutions AID has assisted have a national scope or character. Sixty-four percent of field projects were found to focus on national organizations, with the remainder divided in descending order among sub-national entities that correspond to political jurisdictions; organizations with a multinational focus; multiple institutions that operate at two or more of these levels; and sub-national entities that serve an area that is not necessarily associated with a political jurisdiction. From a sectoral perspective, the majority of AID-assisted institutions were divided between two primary functional groups: economic development/planning and food/agriculture. Organizations concerned with education, health and community development or housing formed smaller clusters in the 16% to 12% range, while infrastructure-related organizations accounted for 9% of the institution-building projects assisted by AID.

These patterns of project design were found to hold for AID's four geographic bureaus. Each bureau displayed all of the patterns described above with respect to a concentration on single institutions, on national-level organizations, on public sector entities and on organizations that focus on development planning or agricultural concerns. At the same time, institution-building activity was found to be more prevalent in the Latin America Bureau than elsewhere: 44% of all projects were from Latin America, followed by Africa with 28%, Asia with 18% and Near East with 10%.

#### Patterns of Success and Failure in Institution-Building Projects

Somewhat under half of the 659 field projects examined in the study had been evaluated or audited by AID. Of the evaluated or audited projects, half had been initiated prior to 1974, including nine that had begun in the 1950s and 78 that were started during the 1960s. Thus, while the portfolio of evaluated or audited projects favors those initiated in the 1970s, it does not neglect earlier efforts undertaken by the Agency. The set of field projects that have been evaluated or audited, and thus included in this study, is also skewed in favor of projects initiated by the Latin America Bureau: over 49% of the evaluated/audited projects are from that region. The bias reflects both the large number of institution-building projects in Latin America (see above) and the higher proportion of Latin America projects that have been evaluated or audited. The Bureau for Africa had the lowest percent of evaluated/audited projects.

The analysis of evaluated and audited projects undertaken in this study was designed to find patterns of positive comments on project performance and achievement as well as patterns of negative comments. The process used to identify these patterns involved a review of

evaluation and audit abstracts and "spot check" validation of the abstracts against the original documents. The "internal" project factors considered in assessing whether an evaluation or audit reported positive or negative findings on project performance and achievement included comments and discussions concerning: adequacy of project planning and management; achievement of initial project results (outputs); project staff (both host country and contractor); procurement; financial arrangements governing the project; and non-monetary support for the project (e.g., support by other government entities). Several "external" factors were also catalogued, including political changes, inflation, natural disasters, devaluation, epidemics, and so forth.

In quantitative terms, the majority of the reporting in AID evaluations and audits concentrated on factors that the study considered to be "internal" to projects. Ninety-four percent of all specific comments made in audits and evaluations of the 159 projects examined in detail dealt with "internal" factors of the type identified above. Of the comments on "internal" factors, 34% dealt with the adequacy of project management and the achievement of initial outputs, while another 31% focused on the adequacy of project planning. The remaining comments were divided among references to project staff (13%), non-monetary support (7%), financial arrangements (6%) and procurement and commodities (2%). Only 6% of all comments referred to normally unforeseeable "external" factors.

In terms of the type of comments made, the distribution between positive and negative comments in evaluative documents was most striking with respect to the adequacy of project planning. Negative citations or findings in this area outweighed positive comments by nearly two to one, even though this aspect of projects was less frequently the subject of comment than was project management and results achievement. In the case of project management and results, the citations were almost evenly divided between positive and negative. A roughly even distribution of positive and negative findings also characterized audit and evaluation comments concerning project staff. Mentions about financial arrangements tended to be more negative than positive, as were comments about non-monetary support for projects. While there were only a few comments concerning procurement and commodities, all were negative.

Both the proportion and distribution of these evaluation and audit findings were examined in terms of the major clusters of AID-assisted institution-building projects discussed above. In a comparison of evaluative comments for public and private sector projects, the tendency of citations was found to be appreciably more positive in the case of efforts that target private entities. A possible reason for the better showing on the part of private sector projects may be

a difference in size: private projects are on average half the size, in financial terms, as their public-sector counterparts; they are, therefore, more manageable and easier to monitor. Private-sector recipients of AID support may also be more highly motivated and intimately involved in project progress. While the difference between projects targeted at public and private institutions was found measurable, no such differences stood out in comparisons of national versus sub-national projects; in projects that assist one versus two or more institutions; or on a geographic basis.

For all project clusters, negative comments followed identical patterns: most concerned project implementation; roughly a third referred to project design failings; and only a tenth cited "external" factors. Project design complaints noting failure to sufficiently involve and commit the host government in planning, and the creation of overly ambitious or complex designs, were attributed to projects targeting public entities, not private ones. Comments about unrealistic time frames also referred predominantly to public sector projects. On the other hand, projects focusing on private institutions cited poor or ineffectual management and administration far more often than any other weaknesses. The study, however, revealed no significant difference between negative comment patterns for national-level versus subnational-level institutions.

While a "pattern analysis" of evaluation and audit findings of the sort undertaken by this study cannot provide definitive answers concerning why projects succeed or fail, in the manner of an AID "impact evaluation," such research can identify across a broad spectrum of projects the types of factors which appear to govern success and failure and which can apparently be managed in ways that bring about success. The comments that were found in evaluative documents came out positive for some projects and negative for others, suggesting quite strongly that performance is something AID planners and managers can affect by their attention both to areas where projects appear to be highly vulnerable (i.e., as likely or more likely to develop trouble than to succeed) and to methodologies and techniques that appear to hold special promise.

The concentration of evaluative and audit comments in a few key areas suggests that AID project design teams and project managers are well advised to pay special attention to those areas. The two most critical areas for attention appear to be project management and the achievement of initial project results, together with the basic effort to plan a project in a proper manner. The quality of project staff, financial arrangements for projects, non-monetary support and procurement also require the attention of project designers and managers.

## Checklist of Lessons Learned

To assist project design teams and project managers, the positive and negative statements from evaluations and audits of institution-building projects have been examined in detail and organized into a 30-page "checklist" of planning and management guidelines (Part II of the study).

The checklist is structured to facilitate project planner and manager review and use. It is coded in terms of project design stage -- i.e., for reference during preparation of the Project Identification Document, Project Paper, Project Agreement and consultant contract -- and project implementation stage. The first section of the checklist presents ideas, hints, comments and cautions concerning key elements of project design: program planning factors, host country factors, project inputs, training, the target institution and special situations. The second section covers project implementation. To particularize and render more immediate the generalized points that are made, the guideline incorporates over a hundred quotations from individual evaluations and audits.

The checklist is presented as a separate and detachable element of the study report, designed for reference by field personnel, and for use in training programs and in conjunction with AID's project design guidance element in Handbook 3: Project Assistance.

The checklist cites over 70 lessons learned regarding project design. Based on the comments of evaluators and auditors, the most important factors in pre-program planning include: completion of in-depth pre-design studies; tailoring the project to meet host-country capabilities; ensuring strong institutional linkages; developing clear, attainable project designs and realistic time-frames; and establishing clear lines of authority.

Concerning the host country's role in project planning, evaluative documents stressed, first and foremost, the need to obtain firm government commitment to project support. Other key lessons include shaping the project so that it furthers the government's development plan; selecting a politically strong and technically competent counterpart agency; identifying and bypassing potential governmental bottlenecks; and ensuring that required local personnel are available and have sufficient experience.

Regarding project inputs during design, assessors stressed the importance of investigating the financial viability of target institutions and their ability to retain personnel; the need to compensate for the effects of inflation; and taking care to specify com-

patible project equipment, duty-free import of project materials and realistic project staffing levels. Finally, evaluative documents reiterated the importance of local-language fluency on the part of contractor personnel, when required.

Most lessons regarding the training aspect of project design concerned participant training. Stressed in this regard were: specifying adequate lead time for the selection, processing, preparation and arrival of participants at their training site; and paving the way for their reintegration in the target organization, upon return.

Concerning the target institution, comments by evaluators and auditors focused planning attention on anticipating potential operating problems of new organizations and providing for their legalization. Accent also was placed on the need to provide for attraction of competent leaders and for indigenization (a prerequisite to institutionalization). For private entities, comments concentrated on the importance of compensating in design for organizational inexperience; early investigation of the entity's past operations and its degree of grass-roots support; and avoidance of over-identifying the private entity with the U.S.

Problems encountered during project implementation suggested significant areas of potential weakness. For AID, negative citations concentrated on absence of sustained support to the contractor or grantee; inconsistent project monitoring; and inflexibility during project delivery, including failure to update project design. The contractor was mainly faulted for improper or inadequate staffing, management and relations with counterparts. Weak management and organization led the list of implementation problems experienced by target institutions; and bureaucratic delays and rapid transfer of government personnel from the target entity were cited most often in regard to the host government's role in implementation.

### Institution-Building Models and Approaches

From the mid 1960s through the early 1970s, AID supported and encouraged work by academics in the then largely unexplored field of institution building. Several contracts, much research and field work and several conferences characterized the efforts. These, and a subsequent smaller-scale attempt to develop a model dealing with institutionalization, developed methodologies that have all but vanished from AID's institutional memory.

The disappearance of the institution-building models can, in part, be attributed to their lack of specificity and failure to stress



certain important factors. Primarily, however, their lack of use appears to have resulted from AID's 1971 adoption of the Logical Framework project design and evaluation matrix. The Logframe -- project-specific and, unlike the institution-building models, applicable to the entire range of AID projects -- has received the Agency's strong, continuing commitment during the last decade.

P A R T I :

PATTERNS IN AID'S  
INSTITUTION BUILDING PORTFOLIO

A . P A T T E R N A N A L Y S I S  
O F P R O J E C T D E S I G N S

Of 905 AID institution-building projects active in September 1974 or since,\* we selected the 659 that represent "field projects" -- i.e., projects of the four geographic bureaus -- for screening and analysis.

The 659 projects were assessed and categorized according to six sets of design characteristics:

- o Geographic bureau;
- o Type of institutional change anticipated;
- o Relationship to/among target institutions;
- o Target institution(s) by functional sector;
- o Public- or private-sector;
- o Political/geographic level of target institution.

Results of our assessments appear below:

PATTERN BY GEOGRAPHIC BUREAU

By far the largest number of institution-building projects, 290, or 44.0% of the total, are from the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean. Next in importance is the Bureau for Africa, with 183 projects, 27.8% of the total. The Bureau for Asia is represented by 122 projects, 18.5% of total. Far behind the others is the Bureau for Near East, with 64 projects, 9.7% of the four-bureau total.




Figure 1. PROJECTS  
BY GEOGRAPHIC BUREAU

---


\* The projects were identified by the Office of Development Information and Utilization of the Bureau for Development Support (DS/DIU) as possessing institution-building characteristics.

## PATTERN BY TYPE OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ANTICIPATED

Overwhelmingly, AID's portfolio of institution-building projects has concentrated on existing entities. Eighty percent of the portfolio aims at strengthening an existing institution or institutions. Only one-fifth attempt to create a new institution or institutions as the major focus. Approximately a quarter of projects seeking to strengthen an existing entity or entities plan to add one or more distinctly new functions to the target institution(s).

Figure 2 reveals that this overall pattern varies little by geographic bureau, except for the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, whose proportion of projects concentrating on new organization(s) -- 27.9% -- is two to three times higher than that of the others.

Figure 2. PROJECTS BY TYPE OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ANTICIPATED




## RELATIONSHIP TO/AMONG TARGET INSTITUTION(S)

To obtain a breakdown of projects by choice of organizational vehicle(s) through which Missions have tried to effectuate change, we divided the DS/DIU universe into four parts: (a) projects with a single institution as the aim; (b) projects that deal with two or more institutions or cohorts with related missions; (c) projects concerned with different institutions that work together; and (d)

projects which involve different institutions working separately.

Figure 3. RELATIONSHIP  
TO/AMONG TARGET INSTITUTIONS



According to Figure 3, the preponderance of projects -- 368, or 55.8% of the 659 total -- deal with a single institution, rather than two or more entities.

The 44.2% of projects that involve more than one institution are divided without significant preference. One-hundred-eleven (16.9% of total) concern institutions with related missions, e.g., two or more agencies of a single ministry. One-hundred-nine projects (16.5% of total) aim at different institutions that work separately, e.g., diverse, unrelated farmer groups and municipalities within a geographic area that is the focus of an integrated rural development program. The remaining 71 (10.8% of total) deal with different institutions or cohorts that work in close cooperation to attain project goal.


Again, the general similarity of pattern among geographic bureaus is striking. The exception in this instance is the Bureau for Asia, whose portfolio is the only one to reflect more concern with multiple institutions (60.7% of total projects) rather than a single institution (39.3%).

#### TARGET INSTITUTION(S) BY FUNCTIONAL SECTOR

We further examined the institution-building universe to identify sectoral foci of AID as a whole and of the geographic bureaus in-

dividually. The DS/DIU report provided appropriation cost symbols, which generally indicate development sector. Finding them sometimes uninformative or inaccurate, we developed our own groupings, based upon the DS/DIU detailed descriptions of the problems being addressed, strategy underlying project design, and project inputs and outputs.

Figure 4. TARGET INSTITUTIONS BY FUNCTIONAL SECTOR



Arrayed in sectoral order of rank by number of projects, we found the following overall frequency of project designs (see Figure 4, above, for details):


1. Economic development/planning/management/administration 25.6%
2. Food/agriculture 23.5%
3. Education/manpower training 15.6%
4. Health/nutrition/family planning 12.8%
5. Community development/housing 12.3%
6. Infrastructure/capital projects 8.5%
7. Multisectoral and other 1.7%

Approximately half of all institution-building designs center on the two leading sectoral groupings (Economic development/planning/management/administration, and Food/agriculture), with one or another placing first or second, except for the Bureau for Near East, in which Food/agriculture, and Education/manpower training tie for first place.

#### PUBLIC- OR PRIVATE-SECTOR TARGET INSTITUTION (S)

In light of AID's heightened current interest in private initiatives, we looked at the private vs. public breakdown of the Agency's institution-building portfolio.

The stress on public sector institutions is overwhelming (see Figure 5, below). Almost four out of five projects (520 of the 659 total) target government or parastatal entities. Another 18% (119 projects) focus on private institutions, including cooperatives, farmer associations, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), banks, labor unions, and so forth. Three percent of the projects divide their attention, apparently equally, between public and private institutions.



It was in the public/private division among projects that we noted the largest differences in geographic bureau patterns. Whereas 92.2%, 91.8% and 81.4% of projects for the Bureaus for Near East, Asia and Africa, respectively, target public institutions -- in


the case of the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, a significantly smaller 69.0% are in that category. Conversely, LAC projects involving private institutions are supported at six times the rate in Asia, four times the Near East rate, and 40% higher than in Africa.

The quantitative difference is most striking. Fully 76 of the four-bureau total of 119 private-sector projects (63.9%) originate in the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean. The Bureau for Africa has a respectable 34 private-oriented projects, but the Bureau for Asia is represented by only five, and the Bureau for Near East by four.

### POLITICAL/GEOGRAPHIC LEVEL OF TARGET INSTITUTION(S)

Our sixth analysis of institution-building project design characteristics involved the level of the targeted institutions. In this in-

Figure 6. LEVEL OF TARGET INSTITUTIONS





stance, we divided the projects into five categories -- those dealing with (a) multinational entities; (b) national organizations; (c) sub-national entities that operate within a standard political jurisdiction, e.g., a state or province; (d) special sub-national entities, e.g., an institution that focuses on a high-potential agricultural region or a troubled urbanized region that cuts across political boundaries; and (e) projects that appear to divide attention equally to organizations at different levels.

Overall, and in the case of each geographic region, projects concentrate chiefly on institutions at the national level. Almost two-thirds of the four-bureau total (63.9%) are national in character, with the proportions for individual bureaus ranging from 71.9% to 58.2% (see Figure 6, previous page).

Second in importance is the sub-national/standard political jurisdiction category, with 14.4%. Multinational and multi-level projects rank next, with 10.3% and 8.2% of total projects, respectively. Last, with 3.2%, is the sub-national/special geographic entities group.

Although there are individual differences among the geographic bureaus, on the whole, their breakdowns among the five national/sub-national categories reflect much similarity.





# B . P A T T E R N   A N A L Y S I S O F   E V A L U A T I V E   A S S E S S M E N T S

## PATTERN OF EVALUATIVE DOCUMENTS BY BUREAU

Of the 659 geographic-bureau project designs in the institution-building portfolio, DS/DIU printouts indicate that 302, or 45.8% have been evaluated and/or audited. Figure 7 reveals that the proportion of assessed projects varies from a high of 53.1% for the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean to a low of 35.5% for the Bureau for Africa.

Figure 7. PROJECTS  
EVALUATED/AUDITED,  
BY GEOGRAPHIC BUREAU

Geographic Bureau	Project Total	Number of Projects Assessed	% of Bureau Projects Assessed
Near East	64	27	42.2%
Asia	122	56	45.9%
LA/Carib.	290	154	53.1%
Africa	183	65	35.5%
Totals	659	302	45.8%




Quantitatively, the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean accounts for 154 evaluated and/or audited projects, more than half of the 302 total for the four bureaus. The Bureau for Africa has 65 evaluated/audited projects, 21.5% of total; the Bureau for Asia has 56, 18.5% of total; and the Bureau for Near East has 27, or 9.0% of total.

## AGE ANALYSIS OF EVALUATED PROJECTS

In order to determine the age profile of the evaluated and/or audited projects, and for the geographic bureaus, we analyzed them by planned initial fiscal year. Figure 8, below, summarizes our findings. By segregating the four-bureau projects that had originated in 1974 (year in which AID's "New Initiatives" thrust was inaugurated) from the others, we discovered that the number beginning in 1973 or earlier (139) is only a shade higher than those starting in 1975 or afterwards (136). Of the pre-1974 projects, 78 date from the 1960s, 52 from 1975-1981, and nine from the 1950s.

Figure 8. PROJECTS EVALUATED AND/OR AUDITED, BY INITIAL FISCAL YEAR AND GEOGRAPHIC BUREAU



The pre- and post-New Initiatives pattern does not vary significantly for three bureaus: for Near East, 14 projects date before 1974 and 14 after; for Asia, 24 projects start before 1974 and 26 after; and for Latin America and the Caribbean, the respective figures are 66 and 73. Only for the Bureau for Africa, with 36 pre-1974 projects and 24 post-1974 projects, is the equilibrium broken.

## PATTERN BY KEY PROJECT CLUSTER AND GEOGRAPHIC BUREAU

In light of the findings from our Section I-A review of institution-building project designs, and in consultation with the PPC/E/PES


study directors, we approached analysis of evaluative findings with three focal aims:

- o To identify the threads of success and failure in significant clusters of projects with like design characteristics.
- o To examine evaluations and audits of projects involving private institutions, because of increased Agency interest in that sector.
- o To assess evaluations and audits of institution-building projects targeted at the sub-national level, both because of past Agency concerns regarding such projects, and because private sector projects normally concentrate on entities that operate below the national level.

Five clusters emerged from this set of considerations:

- I. All projects aimed at strengthening an existing public, national-level institution.
- II. All projects creating a new, public, national-level entity.
- III. All projects targeting private, sub-national institution(s).
- IV. All projects targeting private, national-level institution(s).
- V. All projects focusing on public, sub-national institution(s).

Figure 9 summarizes the cluster pattern by geographic bureau:



A total of 159, or 52.6% of the four-bureau project total fit within the clusters:

- Largest by far, with 70 projects, is Cluster I, "Strengthening an Existing, Public, National-Level Institution;"
- Cluster V, "Public, Sub-National Institution(s)," places second, with 30 projects;
- Evaluated/audited projects in public-sector Clusters I, II and V total 125 projects;
- Private-sector Clusters III and IV total 34 projects;
- There are 109 projects in national-level Clusters I, II and IV;
- Sub-national Clusters III and V contain 50 projects.

As might be anticipated, the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean leads with 78 of the 159 five-cluster projects (49.1% of the total). Africa follows with 36 projects (22.6% of total); Asia with 25 projects (15.7% of total) and Near East with 20 projects (12.6%). This pattern by geographic bureau is quite similar to that for all 659 "field projects" in the institution-building universe (see Figure 1, Chapter III).

#### PROJECT ASSESSMENTS BY CLUSTER

To permit analysis of the five key project clusters in greater depth, we reviewed the evaluative documents registered at DS/DIU for each project. (DS/DIU averages two-and-a-half such documents -- project appraisal reports, project evaluation summaries, special evaluation reports and audits -- for cluster projects.) Studying the abstracts project by project, and noting and tabulating critical comments made by the evaluators and auditors, we then subjectively assigned each project according to its apparent operational result into one of the following groups:

- o Projects for which the positive comments outweigh the negative comments;
- o Projects for which the negative comments outweigh the positive comments;
- o "Uncertain" projects: those for which evaluative comments appear mixed (i.e., the positives seemed to us to counter-balance the negatives), or the project was too young for evaluators to be able to measure progress against plan;\*

---

\* In an effort to determine whether this "uncertain" group of projects differs from those which evaluators and auditors judged predominantly positive or negative, we categorized them by initial

- o Evaluated projects for which the DS/DIU abstracts and project files lack record of evaluative findings. (This is a minor group, comprised of six projects, or 3.8% of total.)




Figure 10.  
OVERALL  
ASSESSMENTS  
OF INSTITU-  
TION-BUILD-  
ING PROJECTS  
BY KEY  
CLUSTERS

fiscal year. We had thought it probable that the "uncertain" group consists mainly of older projects, many lacking Logframes, which evaluators might have found difficult to measure against plan.

To our surprise, we found the age pattern of this neutrally assessed group of projects almost identical with that of the total. Fifteen of the "uncertain" projects have initial dates preceding 1974, and 14 have post-1974 dates -- the same proportion as the 139-to-136 breakdown for all assessed institution-building projects (see above). One project dates from 1974. Of the older projects, three are from the 1950s, four from the 1960s, and eight from 1970-1973. The 14 post-1974 projects date from 1975 through 1979.

Figure 10 (previous page) indicates the resulting pattern. Overall, positive-assessed projects outweigh negative-assessed projects 76 to 53, and 47.8% to 33.3%. For an additional 24 projects, 15.1% of the total, evaluation and/or audit results appear uncertain or mixed.

The pattern by key cluster contains more similarities than differences. For four of the five, positive-assessed projects are more numerous than negative-assessed projects. In the case of Cluster IV, the proportion is 64.3% to 21.5% positive-to-negative. For Cluster V it is 60.0% to 20.0%. For Cluster III it is 55.0% to 35.0%; and for Cluster II it is 44.0% to 36.0%. Only for the largest grouping, Cluster I, do negatives outweigh positives -- and then by a bare 40.0% to 38.6%. We discuss the implications of these findings later in the chapter.

#### PROJECT ASSESSMENTS BY GEOGRAPHIC BUREAU




Figure 11.  
ASSESSMENTS  
OF INSTITU-  
TION-BUILD-  
ING PROJECTS  
BY GEOGRAPHIC  
BUREAU

Figure 11 indicates the pattern of evaluative assessments by geographic bureau. Here, the similarity of pattern among the geographic bureaus is marked; in every case, positives outweigh negatives. For Latin America and the Caribbean, the proportion is 41 to 28


(52.6% to 35.9% of total). For Africa it is 18 to 15 (50.0% to 41.7%); for Asia, 12 to seven (48.0% to 28.0%); and for Near East, five to three (25.0% to 15.0%).

In percentages, the Bureau for Near East result appears strange, because of the large proportion of projects (50.0%) assessed to be of uncertain or mixed result. In that bureau's case, projects assessed positive or negative combine for a total of only 40.0%; the remaining 10.0% of Near East projects are in the "findings unavailable" category.

### ASSESSMENTS OF PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE PROJECTS

If AID's institution-building portfolio is indicative of the total, a positive project result appears more likely when the target institution is private than when it is public. Whereas 56 public-sector

Figure 12. ASSESSMENTS OF PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE INSTITUTION-BUILDING PROJECTS



projects (44.8%) were assessed positive to 43 (34.4%) negative, in the case of projects that target private entities the proportion is a more favorable 20 to 10, and 58.8% to 29.4% (see Figure 12). The figures also indicate that projects focusing on public institutions appear twice as likely to be judged by evaluators/auditors to have uncertain or mixed results.




Based on the institution-building portfolio, we hypothesize two main reasons for the difference. First, projects that target private institutions are smaller (see review of budget size, later in this chapter) and thus more manageable and easier to monitor. Second, private-focused institution-building projects appear normally to involve principals who are deeply involved in the project and personally committed to its success.

### ASSESSMENTS OF NATIONAL VERSUS SUB-NATIONAL PROJECTS

Figure 13 data lead to another unanticipated conclusion drawn from the evaluative documents: positive results appear more likely when the target institution is at the sub-national level than when it is a national-level entity. Positive assessments outweigh negative as-

Figure 13. ASSESSMENTS OF NATIONAL VS. SUB-NATIONAL INSTITUTION-BUILDING PROJECTS



assessments by less than six-to-five for national-level institutions, but by more than two-to-one for sub-national entities (47 to 40 projects for the former, and 29 to 13 for the latter). In percentages, this translates into 43.1% positive versus 36.7% negative for projects concentrating on national-level entities, and 58.0% positive versus 26.0% negative for those strengthening or creating sub-national institutions. In both cases, the uncertain category stands around 15%.

# PROJECT PATTERN BY SIZE OF ESTIMATED BUDGET

For an additional insight into project success and failure, we analyzed the 155 evaluated and/or audited institution-building projects in the five key clusters by size of estimated budget. (Four of the 159 DS/DIU abstracts lack a budget figure.) The 155 projects have an average (mean) budget of \$3,963,000. Overall, they total \$614,189,000 in planned expenditures. Projecting the average budget estimate to all 659 institution-building projects in the DS/DIU universe, they represent approximately \$2.6 billion of planned AID investments.

Figure 14. ESTIMATED BUDGET TOTALS BY KEY CLUSTER AND NATURE OF ASSESSMENT (in thousands of dollars)

Cluster	Positive		Negative		Uncertain		TOTAL	
I	(27)	\$81,174	(28)	\$143,205	(14)	\$65,122	(69)	\$289,501
II	(11)	38,177	(8)	23,511	(6)	31,361	(25)	93,049
III	(10)	6,990	(7)	15,172	(2)	2,147	(19)	24,309
IV	(9)	36,740	(3)	9,827	(2)	2,074	(14)	46,641
V	(16)	84,216	(6)	15,720	(6)	58,753	(28)	158,689
Total	(73)	\$247,297	(52)	\$207,435	(30)	\$159,457	(155)	\$614,189
Mean per Project	\$3,388		\$3,989		\$5,315		\$3,963	
Note: Number of projects shown in parentheses.								

Projects judged to have overall negative results tend to be larger in size than those deemed to have overall positive results (\$3,939,000 to \$3,388,000). The difference is a relatively small 15%. However, the average size of institution-building projects whose evaluative assessments seem uncertain is a relatively large \$5,135,000. This may indicate that, (a) on the average, the larger a project, the more difficult it is to assess overall success, or more likely, (b) evaluators and auditors tend to get bogged down on project details more easily in the case of large, complex operations, and fail to comment in sufficient depth on overall success or failure.

Incidentally, there is no discernible positive versus negative pattern by project size. The smallest of projects (those with budgets around \$100,000) as well as the largest (those in the \$30,000,000 range) can turn out to be successes or failures, depending on various factors, including importantly the skill with which they have been designed and implemented.

## SIZES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROJECTS

The average size of projects targeting public institutions is twice the size of those focusing on private entities. No matter whether the statistical measure is the arithmetic mean or the median, the

Figure 15. SIZES OF PROJECTS  
TARGETING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE  
INSTITUTIONS (in \$ Thousands)

Cluster, Public Instttn(s)	Mean Estimated Budget	Cluster, Private Instttn(s)	Mean Estimated Budget
I	\$4,196	III	\$1,279
II	3,722	IV	3,474
V	5,667		
Weighted Average	\$4,436	Weighted Average	\$2,211

Cluster, Public Instttn(s)	Median Estimated Budget	Cluster, Private Instttn(s)	Median Estimated Budget
I	\$1,895	III	\$282
II	2,424	IV	\$2,070
V	2,021		
Weighted Avg. of Medians	\$2,032	Weighted Avg. of Medians	\$1,041

result is the same (see Figure 15). The mean estimated budget for a project strengthening or building a public institution is \$4,436,000, compared to \$2,211,000 for a project aimed at a private entity. The median for a public-oriented project is \$2,032,000, compared to \$1,041,000 for a project focusing on a private institution.

(The two-to-one difference between mean and median average figures is caused by distortions resulting from a plethora of small projects at one end of the size scale, and the relatively few large projects with estimated budgets over \$10,000,000 at the other end.)

## SIZES OF NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL PROJECTS

Based on our sample, project size can be ruled out as a significant factor in differences between results from projects that target

national-level institutions and those that institution-build at the sub-national level (see Figure 16). For national-level projects, the average estimated budget is \$3,993,000. For sub-national projects, the average size is \$3,384,000 -- \$99,000, or a bare 2.5%, smaller.

Figure 16. SIZES OF PROJECTS  
FOCUSING ON THE NATIONAL AND  
SUB-NATIONAL LEVELS (\$000s)

Cluster, National Instttn(s)	Mean Estimated Budget	Cluster Sub-National Instttn(s)	Mean Estimated Budget
I	\$4,196	III	\$1,279
II	3,722	V	5,667
IV	3,474		
Weighted Average	\$3,993	Weighted Average	\$3,894

C . Q U A N T I T A T I V E B R E A K D O W N  
O F E V A L U A T I V E R E P O R T F I N D I N G S

On the following five pages is a list that classifies and ranks 455 individual positive and negative citations from evaluative documents covering the 159 projects in the five key institution-building clusters discussed in Section B, above. The list is divided as follows:

Project Design

Concept planning proficiency, i.e., citations dealing with the competence and/or realism of project design. (The citations comment on output, purpose and goal characteristics.)

Implementation

Management competence in program delivery. (These citations deal with input-to-output transformations.)

Project resources: personnel, commodities, financial, and other. (These deal with inputs and assumptions.)

Non-resource support within the host country. (The citations deal with assumptions.)

External Factors

Normally unforeseeable political, economic, climatic events that have affected project success. In our five-cluster project sample, the impacts were uniformly negative.

Following the list of citations is a short analysis of negative comments by factor and cluster. The analysis appears on page I-25.

QUANTITATIVE BREAKDOWN OF EVALUATIVE REPORT FINDINGS, BY FACTOR - 1

POSITIVE CITATIONS	NEGATIVE CITATIONS
<u>(50 Positive) CONCEPT PLANNING PROFICIENCY (92 Negative)</u>	
<p><u>26</u> Project design was sound; purpose(s) accomplished (specifics not cited).</p> <p><u>6</u> Host country counterparts/institution(s) participated with AID in planning project; formal/legal establishment of target institution attained/proceeding according to project design.</p> <p><u>5</u> Specific outputs achieved according to project design; trainees placed; value of program proven; significant social/human benefits.</p> <p><u>4</u> Project design was practicable, limited in size or scope, or flexible.</p> <p><u>2</u> Localization or indigenization, or institution effected or proceeding satisfactorily.</p> <p><u>2</u> Interdisciplinary or multi-sectoral approach effective.</p> <p><u>2</u> Project success is replicable; projects well chosen.</p> <p><u>2</u> Fixed Amount Reimbursement contracting technique effective, contributed to project success.</p> <p><u>1</u> Program revenue from participants ensures viability.</p>	<p><u>20</u> Project design defect(s) -- unspecified.</p> <p><u>11</u> AID failed to consult adequately with host country sponsor entity on project design/goal; project inconsistent with host country and/or AID sectoral goals; host country policy inhibits achievement of purpose or goal.</p> <p><u>8</u> Time frame or goal unrealistic or not achieved; unrealistic benchmarks.</p> <p><u>7</u> Output in accord with design, but purpose not accomplished.</p> <p><u>7</u> Design overly ambitious/complex; must be restructured.</p> <p><u>6</u> Target institution lacks expertise to accomplish project.</p> <p><u>5</u> Overlapping/ill defined responsibilities/authority of target entity.</p> <p><u>4</u> Project purpose unclear/vague.</p> <p><u>4</u> Project evaluation criteria/methodology excessively oriented toward internal project design criteria, rather than toward external project results.</p> <p><u>2</u> AID failed to monitor/manage the project adequately.</p> <p><u>2</u> Significant operational component dropped from project.</p> <p><u>2</u> Project Paper lacked clarity on end-of-project status.</p> <p><u>2</u> Lack of technically sound, detailed work plan.</p>

(Continued)

QUANTITATIVE BREAKDOWN OF EVALUATIVE REPORT FINDINGS, BY FACTOR - 2

POSITIVE CITATIONS	NEGATIVE CITATIONS
<u>Concept Planning Proficiency (Continued)</u>	
	<u>1</u> No impact at purpose level. <u>1</u> Adverse cultural factors not perceived. <u>1</u> Institution impinges on functions of existing entities. <u>1</u> Local hostility to U.S. links of contractor. <u>1</u> AID pre-design studies/data obsolete/factually wrong. <u>1</u> Project focus on infrastructure wrong strategy; shift to technical assistance. <u>1</u> Required U.S. procurement violated host country law. <u>1</u> Reliance on unilateral AID inputs inhibits institutionalization. <u>1</u> Project design failed to provide for bilingual capability in trainees. <u>1</u> Poor project site selection. <u>1</u> Host country could not provide trainee candidates. <u>1</u> Complexity of project startup underestimated.
<u>(70 Positive) PROGRAM DELIVERY/MANAGEMENT (83 Negative)</u>	
<u>18</u> Outputs are on or ahead of schedule.	<u>20</u> Implementation behind schedule/not effected.
<u>13</u> Good/superior performance by contractor.	<u>13</u> Poor/ineffectual administration/operations.
<u>7</u> Training is effective.	<u>7</u> Institutional capability not improved.
<u>6</u> Good cooperation among AID, target entity & contractor.	<u>6</u> Poor/incompetent contractor.

(Continued)

QUANTITATIVE BREAKDOWN OF EVALUATIVE REPORT FINDINGS, BY FACTOR - 3

POSITIVE CITATIONS	NEGATIVE CITATIONS
<u>Program Delivery/Management (Continued)</u>	
<p>5 Agricultural production increased according to plan.</p> <p>4 Effective fiscal and/or operations controls.</p> <p>4 Access to services was improved; target population reached.</p> <p>4 Planned project studies published and utilized.</p> <p>3 Indigenization increased.</p> <p>1 Baseline data and data bank developed.</p> <p>1 Small-farmer participation as projected.</p> <p>1 Project equipment is in use and being maintained.</p> <p>1 Training revised from original plan to ensure practicality.</p> <p>1 Innovative and effective field operations.</p> <p>1 Decision-makers provided with needed information thru establishment of evaluation system.</p>	<p>7 AID project management inadequate.</p> <p>6 Loan funds not channeled to target group; collections/repayment too slow; disbursed too rigorously.</p> <p>3 Management of target entity inexperienced/incompetent.</p> <p>2 Project effects antithetical to project purpose.</p> <p>2 Lack of local language materials/fluency impeded implementation.</p> <p>2 Poor reporting by contractor.</p> <p>2 Production increases not realized.</p> <p>2 Target population not reached.</p> <p>2 Tech support staff inadequate.</p> <p>1 Arbitrary host government/agency policy changes.</p> <p>1 Advisory services needed after end of project.</p> <p>1 Ineffective computer center.</p> <p>1 Contractor creditability eroded.</p> <p>1 Target entity not creditworthy.</p> <p>1 Purpose and goal affected by lack of crucial project output.</p> <p>1 Training poorly planned/executed.</p> <p>1 Lack of needed local personnel.</p> <p>1 Turnover of project management.</p>
<u>(26 Positive) PROJECT INPUTS: PERSONNEL (31 Negative)</u>	
<p>15 Good/superior contractor staff/leadership.</p> <p>9 Good host country personnel.</p>	<p>11 Host country personnel not assigned to/not recruited for the target institution.</p> <p>(Continued)</p>



QUANTITATIVE BREAKDOWN OF EVALUATIVE REPORT FINDINGS, BY FACTOR - 4

POSITIVE CITATIONS	NEGATIVE CITATIONS
<u>Project Inputs: Personnel (Continued)</u>	
<p>1 Trainees enthusiastic/well = trained.</p> <p>1 Harmonious working relation- = ship between contractor staff and host government agencies.</p>	<p>8 Staffing impeded by poor pay, iso- = lated project sites; very high personnel loss/turnover.</p> <p>4 Contractor staff ineffectual. =</p> <p>2 Late contractor staff arrivals. =</p> <p>2 Incompetent counterpart personnel. =</p> <p>1 Bad contractor staff management. =</p> <p>1 Contractor lacked pertinent = experience.</p> <p>1 Contractor's advice rejected by = target institution.</p> <p>1 Unable to recruit English-fluent = participant trainees.</p>
<p>(0 Positive) <u>PROJECT INPUTS: COMMODITIES (9 Negative)</u></p>	
	<p>6 Late procurement/delivery of = commodities/equipment.</p> <p>2 High rate of equipment downtime. =</p> <p>1 Commodity arrivals slowed by host = country port clearance process.</p>
<p>(10 Positive) <u>PROJECT INPUTS: FINANCIAL AND OTHER (18 Negative)</u></p>	
<p>7 Adequate/timely host coun- = try financial support.</p> <p>1 Project performance enhanc- = ed by ability to use sur- plus U.S. commodities.</p> <p>1 Important project training = provided by other donors.</p> <p>1 Target institution contri- = buted to project funds.</p>	<p>13 Host country funding inadequate, = late, not disbursed.</p> <p>2 Lack of local logistical support. =</p> <p>1 Target ministry not equipped to = service U.S. advisors.</p> <p>1 Host government procedures overly = rigid.</p> <p>1 Required matching funds problem- = atical.</p>
<p>(Continued)</p>	

QUANTITATIVE BREAKDOWN OF EVALUATIVE REPORT FINDINGS, BY FACTOR - 5

POSITIVE CITATIONS	NEGATIVE CITATIONS
<u>(8 Positive) NON-PROJECT LOCAL SUPPORT (28 Negative)</u>	
5 Other government ministries/ = entities (non-project-relat- = ed) provided support.	17 Project shortfalls due to failure = of other government entities to = provide political support.
2 Strong support to project = effort by local populations.	6 Inter-ministry cooperation poor. =
1 Trainees have contributed to = the national quality-of- = life.	2 Poor information feedback. =
	2 Another government entity failed = to provide needed linkages.
	1 Poor national to sub-national = level communications.

EXTERNAL FACTORS IMPACTING PROJECT PERFORMANCE

Political: 4 Change of government/pertinent officials.  
3 Unanticipated reorganization of cognizant ministry.  
2 Political instability in host country.  
1 Power struggle within ministry.  
1 Military action in project area.  
1 High protectionist host government tariff polity.  
1 Host government civil service rules discourage  
trainees' expectations of employment.

Economic/  
Natural: 9 Inflation eroded project budget.  
1 Oil price-driven rise in fertilizer cost.  
1 Heavy rain/flooding in area.  
1 General deterioration of economy.  
2 Currency devaluation.

Social: 1 Increase of disease, due to spread of infection  
from a neighboring country.  
1 Religion of target population different from that  
of project leadership.

## ANALYSIS OF NEGATIVE CITATIONS BY TYPE OF TARGET ENTITY

The preceeding Quantitative Breakdown of Evaluative Report Findings indicates citation frequencies on a global basis. To ascertain whether significant differences appear by type of target institution (e.g., private vs. public, or national-level vs. subnational-level), we further analyzed the negative citations by key project cluster. Our findings:

There is no important difference among clusters concerning proportions of citations referring to project design factors, implementation factors and external factors. Negative comments referring to implementation predominate for each cluster (ranging from 68.8% to 50.0% of total citations). Negative comments concerning project design invariably rank second in frequency (with from 35.7% to 21.8% of total citations for each cluster). A poor last place is held by comments referring to external factors (ranging from 14.3% to 3.0% of cluster mentions).

In the project design category, the largest individual citation grouping -- complaints about failure of AID to consult adequately with host country sponsor on project design/goal, etc. -- not surprisingly is confined to projects in Clusters I, II and V, which target public institutions. The same is true for complaints citing overly ambitious/complex project designs. Similarly, the second largest project design grouping -- remarks about unrealistic time frames/goal -- is confined mostly to public target institutions.

However, a substantial proportion of negative citations in the largest grouping of the management-competence-in-program-delivery category (i.e., poor/ineffectual administration/operations) refers to private target institutions. Indeed, one-quarter of all adverse comments in the entire list directed at private institutions concern that single management failing.

In the resources/inputs group, the largest proportion of complaints (i.e., those referring to inadequate government political and financial support) apply to public, not private, institutions.

We found no significant differences between negative citation patterns for national-level institutions and subnational-level institutions.

Adverse external factors have affected all types of projects. As noted earlier, however, such citations account for a small fraction of total negative comments.

P A R T I I :

INSTITUTION BUILDING

C H E C K L I S T

FOR PROJECT DESIGNERS AND MANAGERS

# K E Y   L E S S O N S   L E A R N E D

## A CHECKLIST FOR DESIGNERS AND MANAGERS OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING PROJECTS

This section synthesizes key reported "lessons learned" from the catalogued totality of recent, evaluated institution-building projects of the Bureaus for Near East, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa -- the 302 "field" projects, active in September 1974 and since, that are accessed from DS/DIU's collection with the key subject descriptor "Institution Building."

The section starts with a 1-1/2 page itemized summary of key lessons learned from our analysis.

The summary is followed by a comprehensive 28-page "checklist" that is designed to serve as a practical guide for project designers and managers in the field. It details and particularizes the key lessons, and organizes them by subject and by project-design stage and document, and implementation stage.

### SUMMARY OF KEY LESSONS

#### During Project Design

##### Lessons learned re. program planning factors:

- o Undertake in-depth pre-design studies.
- o Tailor the project to host-country capabilities.
- o Set realistic time frames.
- o Develop clear and attainable project design.
- o Establish strong institutional linkages.
- o Formulate clear lines of authority and/or relationships among project participants and sponsors.

##### Lessons learned re. host country factors:

- o Obtain government commitment to support the project (the commitment is prerequisite to success).
- o Design project to further the government's development plan.
- o Select a politically strong/technically competent counterpart agency.
- o Thoroughly investigate the availability and experience of required local personnel.
- o Identify and compensate for potential problems that may result from the host government's bureaucratic process.

#### Lessons learned re. project inputs:

- o Investigate the financial viability of the target institution and its ability to retain personnel through payment of reasonable/competitive salary levels.
- o Provide in design for adverse impacts of inflation.
- o Specify compatible project equipment.
- o Insist on duty-free import of project materials.
- o Specify realistic project staffing levels.
- o Insist on local-language fluency when required of contractor.

#### Lessons learned re. training:

- o Check that the institution will provide graduates with diplomas required for further advancement educationally or in the job market.
- o Allow adequate time for teaching the socially and economically disadvantaged (a longer-than-normal process).
- o Specify sufficient lead time for participant trainees.
- o Pave the way for reintegration of returned participant trainees in the institution.

#### Lessons learned re. the target institution:

- o Anticipate potential management problems, especially in the case of new entities.
- o Provide for attraction of competent leaders.
- o Remember that indigenization is a key aim of institutionalization.
- o Obtain agreement that formal legal status will be accorded the target entity.
- o For private institutions:
  - focus design attention on overcoming organization inexperience;
  - investigate the entity's past operations and grass roots support;
  - avoid over-identification of the institution with the U.S.

#### Problems Encountered During Program Delivery

Attributable to AID: Lack of sustained backstopping support to contractor or grantee; inconsistent project monitoring; inflexibility during implementation, including failure to update project design.

Attributable to contractor: Inadequate/improper staffing, project management, leadership and/or communication with host-country personnel.

Attributable to the host government: Delays caused by the bureaucratic process, and too-rapid transfer of government personnel from the target institution.

Attributable to the target institution: Weak management, organization and/or leadership.

## KEY LESSONS LEARNED: A CHECKLIST FOR DESIGNERS AND MANAGERS OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING PROJECTS

The following checklist is comprehensive. It results from analysis of all 302 recent, evaluated institution-building projects of AID's four geographic bureaus in the DS/DIU collection (projects active in September 1974 and subsequently).\*

Although comprehensive, the checklist is not all-inclusive. Because it is a compendium that results from empirical analysis of catalogued evaluative documents that have reached DS/DIU's files, it is incomplete -- for not all the PARs, PESs, Special Evaluation Reports and Audits prepared of the projects during the past seven years have been submitted to AID's documentation center in Washington, DC.

However, as a distillation of "lessons learned" comments made in over 700 evaluative documents, the checklist represents a valuable potential tool for designers and managers of institution-building projects.

For ease of use, the checklist has been developed to reflect both subject matter and timing:

Sections 1 through 6 (pages II-5 through II-22) contain ideas, hints, comments and cautions (culled from the evaluative documents) that deserve attention during the project design phase, when the following are prepared:

- o Project Identification Document (PID);
- o Project Paper (PP);
- o Project Agreement (PROAG); and
- o Consultant Contract.

(Each subject is keyed to the appropriate project design document(s).)

Sections 7 and 8 (pages II-22 through II-30) call the attention of project designers and managers to problems that can and have arisen during implementation.

To particularize and render more immediate the generalized points made in the checklist, we have liberally quoted and paraphrased

---

\* The 302 projects consist of 159 in the five key clusters analyzed in detail in Sections I-B and I-C, plus an additional 143 evaluated institution-building projects, not included in the key cluster matrix, that appear on the DS/DIU printout of evaluative abstracts.

from documents that cover approximately half of the projects we reviewed. In all instances, potentially distracting country and specific-institution identifiers have been removed. Unless the quotes are referenced in the text, they originated in the 302 evaluated projects that appear in the DS/DIU printouts.

Organization of the checklist (starting on the next page) follows:

PROJECT  
DESIGN:

1. Program Planning Factors
  - Pre-Design Studies
  - Overall Design Guidelines
  - Realistic Time Frames
  - Lines of Authority
  - Clarifying Project Roles
2. Host Country Factors
  - Commitment of the Host Government
  - Host Country Counterpart Agency
  - Host Country Personnel
  - Host Country Bureaucratic Process
3. Project Inputs
  - Financial Inputs
  - Commodity Inputs
  - Personnel Inputs
4. Training, including Participant Training
5. The Target Institution
  - Management
  - Personnel Retention
  - Indigenization
  - Legal Status and Local Laws
6. Special Situations
  - Private Entities
  - Projects with Construction Elements
  - Isolated Project Sites
  - Study-Oriented Projects

PROJECT  
IMPLEMEN-  
TATION:

7. Program Delivery
  - Implementation by AID
  - Implementation by the Contractor
  - Implementation by the Target Institution
  - Implementation by the Host Government
8. Delivery of Inputs
  - Commodity Inputs
  - Financial Inputs
  - Local Logistical Support
  - Personnel Inputs



[illegible]

- o Collect sufficient baseline data. Evaluators of an unsuccessful project note: "Because no baseline data was collected in those communities affected by the road construction, it was impossible to determine the socio-economic impact of this project component."
- o Use latest available data. Several evaluations stress the importance of pre-design feasibility studies. A striking example: "Studies and data upon which the project design was based were obsolete, misleading and often factually incorrect."
- o Check demographics. "Many of the schools which were constructed/reconstructed under the project were being underutilized," reports a project assessment, "several were located in either very sparsely populated areas or areas which were already adequately served by existing schools. A sufficient number of teachers could not be found to enable the full operation or even opening of other project schools."
- o Explore cost/benefit aspects in depth. First indications may be erroneous. For example, "Although irrigation provides the opportunity to grow two crops each year and this double cropping has led to increased on-farm employment, these effects have not necessarily led to real income benefits for the individual farm families (of the target population), particularly since they must curtail off-farm employment. Increasing costs of production, debt burdens from capital investments and persistent technical and water management problems (also) have dampened the rise in farm incomes. The small farmers do not receive the higher price paid by the government exporting company because they cannot afford to adequately treat the rice after harvest."
- o Investigate the effects of pertinent government policies. A high host country protectionist tariff policy, which maintained high agricultural costs and inhibited new technology, adversely affected the success of at least two of the institution building projects reviewed.






- o Base assumptions upon country-specific practice and experience. One evaluation reports, "The project design incorrectly assumed that the host country would soon possess a U.S.-type business environment, while in fact the public sector will likely remain dominant for some time."

A mistake made in another project should have been easier to avoid: "The erroneous assumption that men, not women, were the chief livestock raisers," notes an evaluator, "required project changes...socio-economic studies should be made before a project is under way."

- o Country-specific experience includes historic, climatic and physiographic patterns. Poor project performance is attributed to insufficient pre-design attention to prevailing conditions in the natural environment. (We do not refer to "acts of God" -- unforeseeable events such as earthquakes, extensive flooding of the project area, or "the most severe drought in 50 years" -- which evaluators report have blighted project prospects.)

#### Overall Design Guidelines

- o Review designs of consultants. An evaluation calls for close guidance by Mission technicians of outside consultants who plan projects for USAID. The complaint: "The consultant developed project concepts and task force functions that were too abstract." (The comment presupposes presence of a knowledgeable technical person on the Mission's staff.)
- o Tailor the project to host country capabilities. A representative comment: "Projects with complex goals do not fit a 3-5 year time-frame in a truly developing country. Plans should be only as complex as the host country is ready to accept and support. Complexities can be inserted later."
- o Consider innovative approaches. In a section on "Institutional Strength and Growth," a recent AID Impact Evaluation Report\* notes that "Project designers

PID	PP	PROAG	Contract	Implemen.
				
				
				
				
				

\* Morocco: Food Aid and Nutrition Education, AID Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 8, August 1980, p. ii.



Unrealistic time frames are often cited as a cause of project confusion and uneven project progress. The following are among problems identified:

- ## Lines of Authority

- o Establish clear lines of authority between host-government agencies participating in the project. Several projects suffered from misunderstandings and conflicts resulting from ill-defined relative roles of government agencies.

[illegible]

II-8



[illegible]

- o Involve the government in project design. Host country involvement in design is often a prerequisite to host country commitment. One quote from among many: "Success is hampered because host country staff were not deeply involved at the project design stage."
- o Favor projects that seek to further the government's development plan. Such projects encourage commitment, e.g., "The project has overt government backing; the project philosophy of the (non-formal) training center exemplifies the host government's stress on self-reliance and dramatizes the idea that, through hands-on instruction, even the least educated can help themselves, their family, their community and their government. The center is seen proudly as an indigenous institution, not a foreign one."
- o Seek community support; it also enhances commitment. "The target institution's national board -- representing the civic, government, education and business communities -- is effective in generating local financial and moral support."

- o Focus on the "right" ministry or host-country entity -- "right" in the political sense, in the ability of the counterpart agency to move forcefully in project support and to take advantage of project-based help. Placing the project under incorrect or ineffectual auspices causes slippage and trouble. For example, this evaluation comment: "Selecting the education research unit of the Ministry of Education as the implementing agency was a mistake. It has no operational responsibility in non-formal education (the concern of the project), whereas the Directorate of Community Education is responsible for non-formal education in the country."
- o Assess the agency's capabilities. A typical evaluative comment: "Project design was overambitious and unrealistic in light of the Ministry's capabilities. This is one of the reasons that the Mission has earned a negative image at the Ministry."







o Check on the financial resources of sub-national entities. Often the financial resources of provinces and states are reported to be insufficient to carry on the project at indicated levels. The stated reason: inadequate sources of revenue.

o Provide for the effects of inflation. Inflation is the external economic factor that has most impacted project designs.\* Uniformly, the impact has been adverse; frequently, the impact has been disastrous. Many evaluations refer to inflation, citing its raising of construction costs and wages, and the havoc it plays with budgeted financial inputs and program effectiveness. Two examples:







"The institution may not be able to adequately finance a continuing credit program. Because of the high double-digit inflation rate in the country and the low percentage interest rate chargeable on loans, the purchasing power of the funds supplied by the Mission will quickly be depleted. Thus, some assurance is needed that the loan fund will be replenished when needed."

"Despite a 30% increase in construction costs during the past two years, there has been no attempt by the (target) building association to refine the original estimate of cash flow, or to evaluate its capability to absorb current projected costs through revenues."

o Speedy project processing eases financial problems. One evaluation reports: "The project was designed and authorized in 1975 and not signed until 1977, by which time the PP's cost projections were obsolete." Another notes: "Outputs have fallen short because of inadequate funds, directly attributable to cost inflation, result of a two-year hiatus between preparation of the PP and project authorization and the signing of the PROAG."

### Commodity Inputs

o Set commodity costs at realistic levels. Occasional project assessments note that the original planned

PID	PP	PROAG	Contract	Implemen.
				
				
				
				
				
				

\* Other economic factors with cited impacts include currency devaluation, sharp drops in prices for major crops, and oil price-driven rise in the cost of fertilizer products.





plomas has created placement problems. The ex-colonial voc/tech training systems followed in many host countries provide diplomas that qualify graduates for higher-paying jobs.

- o Check whether government trainees obtain per diem. Its absence creates difficulties, e.g., "Training of personnel has been limited, due to lack of government provision of per diem, and training delays have in turn delayed technical assistance. If government cannot provide per diem for participant trainees (in a third country), Mission funds should be reprogrammed and deobligated."
- o Ensure ample lead time for participant training. Numerous comments in evaluations refer to this subject. A typical citation: "The long lead time required for the selection of participant trainees, the time required to gain their admittance to various institutions...plus the 12-24 months required for completion of their studies has led to (lengthy) extension of this activity."
- o Anticipate delays in participant training because of lack of English ability. English language proficiency is a frequent prerequisite for candidates. Evaluations of institution building projects reveal that many were slowed by its absence. Because of the delay caused by absence of English, and the frequent need to raise candidates' skills, many assessments cite the need to plan further in advance for participant training than frequently is done.
- o Check whether participant trainees will lose normal government benefits. Host-government candidates can be difficult to recruit as candidates for training because they sometimes are subject to loss of accumulated leave and associated monetary benefits. In at least one instance, the Mission was instrumental in having the offending regulation changed; but a year was lost in the process.
- o Pave the way for reintegration of returned participant trainees. Two evaluations note that failure to enable returning trainees rejoin the project was a major problem. Another mentions that returnees often find their jobs have been occupied by others.



vernment employees, and their pay scale is lower than other government workers."

"Both (recipient government and AID) overlook the basic causes of failure: non-competitive salaries, alternative employment opportunities...The lesson for AID is that prerequisites for project assistance ought to include attractive terms of service for national scientists and technicians."\*

## Indigenization

- o Remember that indigenization is the aim of institution-building projects. The basic project aim is to leave behind, in the host country, institutions that are managed, operated and funded locally. Evaluative documents seldom refer specifically to the concept; it is generally "a given." One mention: "Contractor's accomplishments in Africanization of the institution have been exceptional."

Another evaluation finds the opposite: "Two flaws in project design are: (a) AID-supported faculty have not (attracted) qualified, motivated researchers to train under them and replace them, and (b) indigenization of research staff is not currently a priority of the institute's administrators."

- o Specify linkages required to accomplish the transformation. An evaluation states, "No provision made for the institution to be transformed from a private agency with foreign donors and local government support to an autonomous government agency coordinating regional services...No linkages were developed with any government departments. As a result, there is no government commitment to the idea of the organization as a regional coordinator of either governmental services or non-governmental programs."\*\*
- o Provide for legal transformation, where necessary. Institutionalization of U.S. PVO-created entities is often ensured by the creation of a legally constituted

[illegible]

\* Report, Kitale Maize: The Limits of Success, AID Impact Evaluation No. 2, May 1980, p 12.

\*\* DAI, "Sustaining Project Benefits," p 15.





But, even when basic management skills are present, the more complex skills can be lacking. For example: "The cooperative is now well established in terms of administration and membership enrollment activities. However, it lacks needed business management and commercial marketing skills."

Another evaluation notes that, "Major problems still exist in the ability of the cooperatives to provide technical information and assistance to farmers. A lack of marketing structure impedes crop diversification."

A possible solution is recommended in another evaluative document: "Future designs in this country must be geared toward pilot programs with strong participatory biases."

- o Concentrate on long-term viability. A few project assessments point out that, although short-term indicators (e.g., increase of membership, increased service to farmers, etc.) may be easy to establish and monitor, design attention that concentrates on them -- rather than on the long-term financial and institutional viability of the association or cooperative -- may imperil the ultimate success of the entire effort.
- o Investigate past operations of the target entity. Evaluations indicate that pre-project analyses into the credit eligibility and competitive position of the assisted association or cooperative would have improved project effectiveness in several instances. One reports that the target organization did not compare well to others in the country, which were preferred by users because of better credit systems and training programs.
- o Pay special attention to credit programs of associations and cooperatives. These are special sources

PID	PP	PROAG	Contract	Implemen.

November 1976, provides insights for the program designer into problems and opportunities involved in progress aimed at building and strengthening small-farmer institutions. In general, the study advocates project focus on organization-building tasks, rather than organizational forms, and concentration on simpler, existing indigenous or transitional forms of small-farmer groups.



of difficulty. One evaluation cautions that "credit activities must take loan delinquency into account at the design level." Another reports that "project funds for agricultural credit were dispersed through four institutions. These programs revealed the administrative costs of dealing with small farmers on an individual basis to be prohibitive in the absence of previously established credit records." (It also found that "delinquency rates are positively correlated with the quantity and quality of supervisory assistance to borrowers in the field.")

- o Stress the need for charging realistic interest rates. A group of evaluators "found that, without an interest rate structure based upon the supply and demand for credit in financial markets, it was impossible to interest private commercial financial institutions in making funds available to the cooperative."
- o Analyze the institution's "grass roots" support. One assessment signals a potential problem: "There is little grass roots support for the target entity by small and tenant farmers who distrust the socially prominent large-scale farmers running the organization...they fear that small-farmer interests may be neglected."
- o Avoid over-identification of the institution with the U.S. The subject has arisen in evaluations of U.S. PVOs and local labor unions. Receptivity normally is higher when the organization is judged to have local roots.

## Projects with Construction Elements

- o Insist on adequate pre-construction economic and environmental studies. In several instances, failure to conduct such studies has hampered or prevented project success.
- o Investigate the applicability of the Fixed Amount Reimbursement (FAR) contracting concept. Several evaluations of projects with construction elements report that use of the FAR concept reduces the Mission's visible involvement in contracting, improves project implementation and helps assure positive results.

[illegible]



[illegible]

- Two assessments report that the Mission's role had changed during implementation. One notes: "Unfortunately, the Mission's role in the project grew from overseer to active participant...the change was made necessary by virtue of the project's complexity."

- Another evaluation testifies to poor follow-up: "The Mission requests of contractor for project progress information and evaluative materials have been ignored, obfuscated or only partially fulfilled." A 1980 audit of a different project notes: "Mission files lacked many of the activity progress and evaluation reports required of the institution, the outside consultant and the Mission. This absence of records made it difficult to assess the factors responsible for the project's 18-month delay. As the project is now complete, there are no recommendations."

- II-23







between the institution and relevant parastatals broke down because of arbitrary policy changes on the part of management." Another reports, "The aggressive tactics of its early leaders established the (target) institution's importance, but alienated many host-government agencies. These leaders were removed and a government decree reduced the institution's power at the national level."

### Implementation by the Host Government

- o Commitment. Poor follow-through on government commitment to a project is mainly characterized by inaction on two fronts: financial and legislative.

Financial commitment. An evaluation early in the life of a project states: "Mission concerned that the host government is committing little of its own funds to the program and is not preparing to assume major responsibility for funding in the foreseeable future." Another, later in the life span of a project, reports: "Government's budget support to the institution remains inadequate. Therefore, Mission has decided to terminate further support to the project through the institution."

Legislative action. Typical evaluative comments in this area include: "Of great concern is questionable government commitment to implementing intended tax reforms," and "Of particular consequence has been a failure of the host government to institutionalize project outputs. Ministry of officials have not demonstrated sufficient interest in the project. Mission faulted for not insisting on joint coordination and planning."

In a third instance, the evaluators report, "There has been no legislation to designate the (target) farmers' cooperatives as retailers of credit to their members. Additionally, retention of decision-making responsibilities by the central government rather than passing them on to local cooperative leaders, to help efforts at self-sufficient management, are harming the project."

- o Bureaucratic process. We quote at length an assessment that epitomizes several comments concerning host-government bureaucratic constraints during im-

PID	
PP	
PROAG	
Contract	
Implemen.	





A typical comment: "Less than 25% of U.S.-procured project equipment was delivered on time. The remainder is over one year late, and no firm delivery date has been established."

- o Customs duty on project material. In three instances, evaluators recommend that Missions take action to recover the cost of customs duties erroneously paid in contradiction of the program agreements.

## Financial Inputs

- o Financial obligations. National governments, sub-national governments, target institutions and Missions all figure in evaluation and audit comments regarding fulfillment of project-stipulated financial inputs. Some of these instances have been noted earlier. In a dozen or so instances, the host government is cited for having failed to meet commitments. Sometimes the criticism is more specific, noting non-provision of promised credit resources or inability to provide counterpart funds. Only rarely is the host government applauded for fulfilling its financial obligations.
- o Monitoring of host country disbursements. The Mission is criticized in an instance that indicates poor project management: "Factors assisting project achievement include belated imposition by the Mission of previously disregarded conditions on disbursements by the (target) institution."

## Local Logistical Support

This is a miscellaneous category of evaluation complaints. Sometimes the comment is general, as, "The chief cause for failure of the project is lack of logistical support by the host government." More often, it is situation-specific, for example: "The government has not provided promised medical facilities, telephones, transportation or electric power."

A wide range of subjects is covered under local logistical support, including non-provision of commodity and technical assistance to U.S. advisors, failure to help the target institution obtain design-specified linkages with other agen-

[illegible]



# APPENDICES

## Appendix A

### METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

Two firm guidelines were observed in performing this work:

1. It was to be empirical in the acquisition and interpretation of data on the design and implementation results of AID institution-building projects. The study relied on what could be learned about such projects from evaluation and audit reports and abstracts of such reports, rather than assessing findings and conclusions in light of foregoing agency issuances or theoretical efforts.
2. Analyses and syntheses of findings were to be structured and reported as unequivocally and clearly as possible to enhance applicability by project designers, implementers and evaluators at USAID Missions in the field. The principal audience for this report is Mission personnel rather than central bureau or other headquarters or regional office staffs.

The study's methodology and process were also influenced by the practical constraint of data base limitations. The agency's compendium of project information is stored in the computerized record of the Office of Development Information and Utilization of the Bureau for Development Support (DS/DIU) -- the Development Information System (DIS) -- whose content is described as follows:

"...DIS is AID's development project experience memory for AID projects which were active in September 1974 or since. Alternative project development approaches and lessons learned from the implementation of specific project designs are recorded for future AID project designer use by abstracting, indexing, and cataloguing AID-generated project design and evaluation documentation.

"Effective 3/12/81, DIS has information on 60% of the development projects active in 1974 or since. This includes the development experience recorded from 2,359 projects (and sub-projects) and 7,043 project documents, in addition to information on 2,565 individuals and organizations who played a major role in the design and implementation of these projects.

### "Database 1: Project Textual Database

...has AID project descriptions which are based on principal design documents; i.e., project papers, non-capital assistance project proposals, loan/capital assistance papers, operating program grant proposals, development program grant proposals, etc. A collection of abstracts describes the design of the AID development project, including the development problem addressed by the project, the overall project strategy (loan/grant, life of project, bilateral/multi-donor, etc.), the Logical Framework design of the project (goal, purpose, outputs, inputs) and a summary description of the project (project components, management, beneficiaries, donors and participants). Each project is indexed with a maximum of 40 project descriptors."

The study team was provided with a printout from Database 1, first in Part 1 - Project Design Information report format:

"Project descriptions based on principal design documents... and descriptive citations of each project document available... Each project description includes the AID project number, the USAID Bureau responsible...the project title, beginning and ending estimated fiscal years, estimated budget amount, problem statement, project strategy, and a summary project description of the major development actions within the project. Also included are data elements related to the Logical Framework approach to the project design; i.e., project goal, project purpose, and project outputs..."

...and subsequently, with abstracts of relevant evaluative documents (project appraisal reports, project evaluation summaries, special evaluation reports, audit reports, interim progress reports, final reports, etc.) in a printout of Part 1 - Project Design and Evaluation Documents, accessed with the key subject descriptor "Institution Building."

From the data in the printouts, we thus identified 906 projects as the universe to be examined. They were found to include 132 sub-projects in addition to the main project designs described. Detailed review of the designs and descriptions further revealed that 15 projects retrieved under the Institution-Building descriptor could not be classified as Institution Building projects, and were dropped from the total.

The universe was further narrowed by the deletion of 100 projects that were originated in central, non-geographic bureaus of AID, or

were special or short-term projects outside the field-mission focus and purpose of this study.\*

After the noted deletions, the breakdown of project designs retained for analysis was:

<u>Geographic Bureau</u>	<u>Number of Projects</u>	<u>Percent to Total</u>
Near East	64	9.7
Asia	122	18.5
Latin Amer./Carib.	290	44.0
<u>Africa</u>	<u>183</u>	<u>27.8</u>
Totals	659	100.0

The consultants, working with the PPC/E/PES study directors, then developed a profile of each of the retained projects based on the following set of design characteristics:

- A. Type of institutional change anticipated
  - o Strengthen existing institution(s)
  - o Create new institution(s)
  - o Add new function(s) to existing institution(s)
- B. Relationship to/among target institutions
  - o Work with/assist one institution
  - o Cohorts of institutions with related missions
  - o Different institutions that work together
  - o Different institutions that work separately
- C. Target institutions by functional sector
  - o Food and agriculture
  - o Economic development, planning, management/administration

---

\* Non-geographical central bureau and special program projects deleted from the study sample broke down as follows:

- 46 - Technical Assistance (TAB)
- 35 - Population and Humanitarian Assistance (PHA)
- 8 - Development Support (DS)
- 5 - Vietnam
- 4 - Private and Development Cooperation (PDC)
- 1 - Food for Peace (FFP)
- 1 - Program and Policy Coordination (PPC)
- 8 - Sub-projects of these bureaus

108

- o Public health and nutrition
  - o Education and training
  - o Infrastructure, capital projects
  - o Community development, housing
  - o Multi-sectoral and other
- D. Public or private sector institution(s)
- o Public sector: governmental and parastatal agencies
  - o Private sector: including cooperatives, associations, for-profit private firms, private voluntary organizations
  - o Both public and private sector institutions
- E. Political/geographical level of target institution
- o Multi-national
  - o National
  - o Sub-national: standard political jurisdictions, local associations, groups or firms
  - o Sub-national: special geographic/development entities
  - o Multi-level

The sample was then encoded to identify clusters of projects with similar characteristics. From the resulting analysis, significant patterns emerged. Five clusters of like projects that emerged were deemed to be significant either quantitatively (i.e., because of the sheer number of projects in the clusters) or qualitatively (i.e., because of special AID interest in certain groups of projects):

<u>Cluster</u>	<u>Focus of Component Projects</u>
I	Strengthen a public, national-level institution
II	Build a new, public, national-level institution
III	Private, sub-national institution or institutions
IV	Private, national-level institution or institutions
V	Public, sub-national institution or institutions

The five key project clusters were subjected to in-depth analysis. Section I-A of this study assesses them by the sets of design characteristics outlined above.

From the DS/DIU Project Design and Evaluation Documents printout, it was determined that 159 of the projects that fell into the key clusters had been evaluated and that abstracts of evaluative documents were available in the DS/DIU file. The study team reviewed the abstracts. Section I-B presents the findings and conclusions of our analysis of the evaluative assessments.

The study team reviewed all of the pertinent abstracts, extracted and noted key findings and statements of the evaluators, grouping them into classes of factors bearing on the success or failure of a project to achieve planned results:

1. Concept planning proficiency (project design)
2. Competence of management/performance
3. Financial resources
4. Personnel -- expatriate and indigenous
5. Timeliness and adequacy of commodities
6. Non-resource host country government support
7. Support of local leaders
8. Support of users, beneficiaries, or market forces
9. External political, economic, social and other factors

Overall conclusions on the projects evaluated -- positive, negative or mixed or uncertain -- were assessed and arrayed for analytical summations in a number of potentially significant comparisons and matrices:

1. Geographical bureaus
2. Project longevity (i.e., the initial funding year was in the 1950s, the 1960s, 1970 to 1973, 1974 -- the year of the new direction in AID strategy -- and the period from 1975 to 1981)
3. Sector of activity (i.e., agriculture and food; economic development, planning, management and administration; health and nutrition, including family planning; education/manpower and training; infrastructure and capital projects; community development and housing, including integrated rural development schemes; and other activities).
4. Public sector vs. private sector projects at various governmental levels

Specific comments with respect to these fields of inquiry and analysis were extracted, grouped and cited specifically to help in guiding the designers, managers/implementers and monitors of projects at USAID missions in enhancing prospects for success and avoiding projects with built-in negative characteristics.



## Appendix B

### INSTITUTION-BUILDING MODELS AND APPROACHES\*

#### AID INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY

In the mid-1950s, AID began developing a number of crude concepts and guidelines on institutional development and building them into its program instructions. For a decade, these efforts were not based on systematic study or analysis. However, in the mid-1960s, AID began to support and encourage work by academics in the then largely unexplored field. The principal example of this work was the 1965 research contract with the Inter-University Consortium on Institution Building, involving Pittsburgh, Indiana, Syracuse and Michigan State universities.<sup>1</sup>

Up to 45 case studies were undertaken during the course of that contract. Based on them and other efforts, models of the institution-building process were conceived and periodically revamped to take account of a variety of conceptual formulations about institutions and how they develop. The ideas gained from this experience were, in turn, used as analytical tools in the course of the three-year Committee for Institutional Cooperation (CIC) study of AID's experience with university contracts to build agricultural organizations in the developing countries.<sup>2</sup>

A workshop seminar at Purdue University in 1968, and a 1979 conference in Washington DC reviewed the principles of the institution building process and explored operational applications of the concept. Under subsequent contractor agreements, institution building seminars were developed and held in the U.S. in 1969 and 1970, and in several developing countries starting in 1971.

Under a contract of the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities (MUCIA) with AID, Melvin G. Blase prepared a study<sup>3</sup> that summarizes the extensive institution building activity undertaken by the academic community. That 1973 work contains a descriptive bibliography of the central literature on the subject (much unpublished) and reviews key concepts and relationships among concepts.

Since that time, there is little tangible evidence of AID-financed academic research in institution-building methodology and models. In spite of this -- and the "New Directions" strategy (1974), through

---

\* Key to numbered footnotes is found in the annex that concludes this appendix.

which AID has stressed provision of direct assistance to the poor populations of the developing countries -- institution building projects remain a large proportion of the agency's total. Fully 31.7%, or 906 of DS/DIU's universe of 2,859 projects active in September 1974 and thereafter appear under the "Institution Building" descriptor.<sup>4</sup>


#### THE ESMAN INSTITUTION BUILDING MODEL

Milton J. Esman, then of the University of Pittsburgh, and colleagues from several universities, conceptualized the project design framework that is the focus of most of the institution-building literature during the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s.

In stating the basic concepts, Esman emphasizes that his approach has a bias toward social engineering that is based on the proposition that the most significant changes in developing countries are deliberately planned and guided. The approach further presupposes that the introduction of change takes place primarily in and through formal organizations. When the organizations are change-inducing, change-protecting and formal, they are considered to be institutions. The organizations and the new patterns they foster become institutionalized, e.g., meaningful and valued in the societies in which they function. This involves a complex set of interactions between the institutions and the environment. The latter varies in its readiness or resistance to change both over time and from place to place.<sup>5</sup>

In the guiding concepts of the Esman model there are two groups of variables that are considered important to understanding and guiding institution-building activity. These are the "institutional variables," which are essentially concerned with the organization itself and the "linkage variables," which are mainly concerned with external relations. The institution-building universe is depicted as follows:<sup>6</sup>

#### THE INSTITUTION BUILDING UNIVERSE



This AID-financed institution-building theory was developed by academicians -- social scientists who in many cases had extensive field

experience. Richard L. Duncan points out that the Esman model occupies a middle point between complex and sophisticated political and economic theories, and trial and error: "It aspires to be a theory in that it attempts to explain what happens under certain circumstances and predict what will happen if certain actions are taken. It is not a complex or mathematical model since it tries to deal with important factors that usually cannot be reduced to numbers (N.B., our underlining). It is unashamedly oriented toward using social science for practical application as well as theory building."<sup>7</sup>

George Axinn, past executive director of MUCIA, notes that the model had been field-tested in the "worldwide crucible of reality," and that, between 1964 and 1968, 38 individual research projects were designed specifically to test the model. They were supported by the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building, and in turn by the Ford Foundation and AID.<sup>8</sup> He closes with these words:

"If an AID administrator, program officer or on-the-spot institution builder will keep the institution-building model in mind, it can help. If he can establish goals and measure programs with these categories, they will contribute. Let him consider leadership, doctrine, program, resources and internal structure. Let him also take account of enabling, functional, normative and diffused linkages. Then he can build a grand strategy of institution building which increases the probability of achieving his goals."<sup>9</sup>

The hoped-for widespread use of the Esman model has not come to pass. After the first half of the 1970s, it disappears from view within the AID project design and evaluation literature and activity.

Of the 302 institution-building projects reviewed in our Part II search for "lessons learned," only one document, a 1971 Special Evaluation Report, mentions the model, noting that, "The evaluation ...is based on Esman's institution building framework." Our September 1981 queries to several AID/Washington staffers, including bureau evaluation officers, concerning the Esman model, brought looks of puzzlement. Few outside of PPC, sponsor of this study, appear to have heard of it. What is the reason for this?

#### WHY HAS THE ESMAN MODEL "VANISHED"?

We have speculated about the reasons that underlie the disappearance of the methodology elaborated by Esman and his various collaborators from the AID design and evaluation process. They appear to include: its abstract nature; failure to stress factors that also are important; adoption by the agency of the Logical Framework Matrix (Log-frame); and institutional memory. We discuss them in order.

o Abstractness and Lack of Specificity

Axinn notes the general, semi-detailed nature of the Esman model: "The institution-building model is a collection of categories, developed for certain uses. It grew out of a long history of human social evolution; out of a contemporary wisdom of the behavioral sciences; out of the fertile minds of (its originators). Its categories -- concepts like leadership, doctrine and language -- are nothing magic or ultimate. They are like other category systems invented by scholars. They may be useful aids in thinking. With them, we can build hypotheses, test and develop principles. These principles, in turn, can be useful guides to action."<sup>10</sup>

An AID consultant concluded in 1974 that the Esman concepts were useful for defining output level requirements in an institution building project, but that Esman and his followers had not made clear the way in which progress against each of Esman's output level concepts was to be measured or monitored in a given project. Further, that the Esman literature had only addressed purpose level indicators of success for an institution at a conceptual level, and that their ideas were not fully defined.<sup>11</sup>

The consultant pointed out that four of Esman's "Institutional Variables," (leadership, doctrine, programs and internal structures) are outputs, and the fifth (resources) is an input, when judged in light of AID's Logframe, and that while outputs are produced and measured, the measure of output production cannot prove achievement of purpose. Thus, for example, doctrine, which is a necessary Esman-type of output cannot also be an indicator that purpose was achieved.\*<sup>12</sup>

---

\* Discussion is still active regarding the level of the Logframe at which institutional objectives should be cited. A 1974 study of agriculture sector programs in Latin America<sup>13</sup> notes that, "in one sense, improvement in institutional capabilities is part of the strategy for accomplishing desired purpose, rather than purpose itself." A subsequent cursory review of institution building project logframes by an AID consultant<sup>14</sup> indicated that organizational development projects were normally framed so that the organization was the project purpose, and that End-of-Project Status measures used were generally concerned with the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization in carrying out its tasks.

A 1981 study sponsored by PPC/E/PES<sup>15</sup> has found that, of 97 co-operative development projects, 45 contain the institutional objective at the purpose level and 52 at the output level, noting that the difference bears further investigation. In response, Frank Dimond, AFR/DP/PPE suggests<sup>16</sup> that institution building might be considered as an input, but one that AID cannot implement, but merely assist.

### o Failure to Stress Important Factors

Another reason for failure of the Esman model to "catch on" is typified by comments of John F. Hilliard, then Director of AID's Office of Education and Human Resources, TAB, at a conference on institution building in December 1969. Criticizing the use of "leadership" as the first of the major variables, he notes that, in expressing the sequence of events, the model should first emphasize the necessity, in conceptualizing the institution, of ensuring that it seeks in an explicit way to respond to an important national purpose. "Such a national purpose," he continues, "may be anything from checking inflation...to initiating land reform. But, until there is a national commitment to a broad-based development effort, the creation of an institution becomes extremely difficult and in most cases, insofar as official action is concerned, virtually impossible."<sup>17</sup>

He then states that, "some kind of charter (i.e., legal identity) needs to be issued to the institution, which is consistent with the national purpose. Without a charter, the institution often finds itself in a competitive environment before it even has anything with which to compete. (It is only after these two prerequisite steps) that leadership can become effective."

Hilliard is correct. Part II of this study notes the numerous citations of adverse impact upon project success of the failure to press actively -- during project design -- for host government commitment to the target institution, and for its legalization.

Hilliard also points out that the problem of being trapped by Esman-stressed doctrine is almost as great a hazard as not having a doctrine at all; and that after a reasonably short period of time, institutions, however innovative, tend to become traditions.<sup>18</sup>

### o Advent of the Logical Framework Matrix

The critical barrier that prevented eventual AID upgrading and use of the Esman model probably was the adoption, in 1971, of the agency's Logical Framework design and evaluation matrix. For the past decade, the Logframe has been the AID-approved methodology for developing and assessing projects.

With the rise of the far more measurable and systematic, agency-sponsored Logframe, the relatively abstract, academic, less-subject-to-finite measurement Esman model was neglected by project designers, who have been encouraged to use the Logframe. The concept of the Logframe has been buttressed by a steady stream of handbooks, guide-

lines, workbooks, progress reports and other documentation detailing and discussing the matrix; and by numerous seminars for program designers and others in its application.

With an AID commitment of that magnitude, it is to be expected that use and mention of the Esman model have disappeared. Besides, the Logframe has universal application to all AID projects, while the Esman model is confined to institution building.

The extensive use of the Logframe in current AID project design and evaluation is dramatized by the fact that all 659 designs in our sample of geographic bureau institution building projects are organized according to the Logframe's matrix (goal, purpose, outputs and inputs). As noted in Part II of this study, many evaluative documents refer specifically to project performance in relation to Logframe design.

#### o Institutional Memory

Lastly, with the continuing change of personnel that is characteristic of all organizations, public and private, AID's organizational memory for the Esman model has grown faint during the eight-or-so years since the institution building concept was the focus of institution-building literature and of AID-supported research activity.

#### MORE RECENT APPROACHES TO PROJECT DESIGN AND EVALUATION

Not satisfied with the Esman model, and concerned about institutional viability, Practical Concepts Incorporated (PCI), an AID consultant, developed in 1974 its own set of measures for assessing "organizationness."

The PCI model has three essential properties -- "Purchasables: money and things to be bought or purchased; Connotation: the affective dimension of attitudes held about an organization; and Image: the cognitive dimension of what people think about an organization."<sup>19</sup> Using these properties, PCI established a logframe-like "P/C/I Balance Sheet" matrix.

Like the Esman model, the PCI model has disappeared from the AID evaluation and design vocabulary. Apparently only one of the 302 evaluated institution-building projects reviewed in Part II of this study used elements of the PCI model -- a 1975 evaluation of the Hassan II Institute of Agronomy and Veterinary Science in Morocco, performed by PCI itself.

The World Bank is not known by us to have formulated an institution building design and evaluation matrix. It does, however, evaluate such projects and measures differences in success rates.

In a recent study by its Projects Advisory Staff,<sup>20</sup> the Bank reports that institutions involved in projects dealing mainly with modern technology and financial matters -- e.g., banks, industrial producers, telecommunications and power generation companies -- generally are more successful than those whose organizations are characterized as "social" or "people-oriented" -- e.g., educational, agricultural and health institutions which provide services and deal more directly with large numbers of individuals.

The Bank describes the former as examples of "tight" projects, in which performance can easily be traced to the participants, and where the effect of bad performance is immediate and widespread. The latter, or "loose" activities, have been found to have more diffuse and hard-to-measure effects, because they depend heavily on unpredictable events such as the weather, involve large numbers of people who are scattered over extensive areas, or are in problem-prone governmental/parastatal organizations.

Like Esman, David C. Korten of the Ford Foundation's Manila office believes there is a substantial need for developmental work directed to demonstrating the successful application of social learning concepts in large government bureaucracies, and to exploring alternative models for such application.<sup>21</sup>

Like the World Bank, Korten agrees that "loose projects" (in Bank terminology) create special design problems. He is generally critical of current design efforts. In a recent article,<sup>22</sup> he concludes that the "blueprint approach" to programming which gained widespread currency in the days of large-scale capital infrastructure project construction continues to dominate action, even though it is manifestly inappropriate to the requirements of new-style programming.

He points out that the "textbook version" of project planning, with its emphasis on careful pre-planning, may be appropriate to physical infrastructure projects, where the task and outcomes are defined, environmentally stable and cost predictable; but that "textbook planning" is an inadequate response to rural development, where the objectives are more often multiple; ill-defined; task requirements are unclear; environments are constantly changing; and costs are unpredictable.<sup>23</sup>

Instead, he advocates that programming frameworks and methods be based on a learning process approach in working with rural people, and that "the approach should integrate action-taking, knowledge creation, and institution building into a coherent learning process."

The Korten approach consists of three stages: learning to be effective, learning to be efficient, and learning to expand.<sup>24</sup>

Gary Hansen, PPC/PDPR, notes that the Korten approach features a joining of knowledge and action, and a creative and open-minded redefinition of program tasks, beneficiary needs and organization structure. He points out, however, that the Korten proposals run counter to deeply ingrained theories and practices followed by most donor and host national governments, and that adoption of the Korten approach would require major changes in conceptions of accountability, time horizons, skill mixes, and so forth.<sup>25</sup>

#### ANNEX: FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Conference Proceedings: Institution Building and Technical Assistance, sponsored by AID and the Committee on Institutional Cooperation, Washington, DC, December 1969.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>Melvin G. Blase, Institution Building: A Source Book, Final Report, Contract No. AID/csd-3392, AID/Washington, 1973.

<sup>4</sup>Based on printout data provided the study team by DS/DIU, August 1981.

<sup>5</sup>Blase, op. cit., pp. (1)4-(1)5.

<sup>6</sup>Milton J. Esman, "Institution Building as a Guide to Action," Conference Proceedings, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>7</sup>Richard L. Duncan, Institution Building - Incidents, Ideas and Applications, Final Report, Contract No. AID/ta-c-1069, AID/Washington, 25 March 1975, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup>George Axinn, "Field Testing the Model," Conference Proceedings, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 35-36.

<sup>11</sup>The P/C/I Model for Assessing Organizational Viability, Volume II, Practical Concepts Incorporated, Contract No. AID/C-otr-C-72-200, W.O. 2, AID/Washington, 10 December 1974, p. II-1.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid. p. II-5.



<sup>13</sup>Intercountry Evaluation of Agriculture Sector Programs, A Program Evaluation Study, Volume 1, "Summary Report," AID/LA, Washington, DC, June 1974, p. 39.

<sup>14</sup>The P/C/I Model, op. cit., p. I-5.

<sup>15</sup>Mary Beth Allen and Molly Hageboeck, "Evaluating Cooperative Development Projects," PPC/E/PES, Draft, 29 September 1981, pp. 8-9.

<sup>16</sup>Frank Dimond, AFR/DP/PPE, "Evaluating Cooperative Development Projects," memo to Molly Hageboeck and Mary Beth Allen, 21 October 1981.

<sup>17</sup>Conference Proceedings, op. cit., p. 24.

<sup>18</sup>Conference Proceedings, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>19</sup>The P/C/I Model, op. cit., p. III-2.

<sup>20</sup>World Bank, "The World Bank and Institutional Development - Experience and Directions for Future Work," Projects Advisory Staff, Washington, DC, 12 May 1980.

<sup>21</sup>David C. Korten, "Management of Social Transformation at National and Sub-National Levels," a Discussion Draft for Asian Institute of Management and the Ford Foundation, 24 March 1981.

<sup>22</sup>David C. Korten, "Rural Development Programming: The Learning Process Approach," Rural Development Participation Review, Winter 1981, Cornell University, Ithica NY.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>25</sup>Gary Hansen, PPC/PDPR, "Some Initial Thoughts on Institutional Development," 26 August 1981, p. 2.

## Appendix C

### RELEVANCE OF AID DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE REVIEWS OF THREE COUNTRY PROGRAMS

Our empirical analysis of DS/DIU abstracts of 302 AID geographic bureau institution building projects and their evaluative documents -- and of a representative number of the documents themselves -- involved us in the micro end of the institution building spectrum. Project designs and evaluations are highly specific. Design abstracts concentrate on the problem(s) which gave rise to the project, discuss the strategy for overcoming or ameliorating the problem(s), summarize the essentials of the Project Paper and/or Program Agreement, and outline key project-Logframe points of reference (goal, purpose and outputs). Evaluative documents -- Project Appraisal Reports, Project Evaluation Summaries, Special Evaluation Reports and Audits -- all focus on project performance against the same Logframe points of reference.

To supplement the assessment of the DS/DIU institution-building universe, we reviewed, among other literature, separate reports covering AID development assistance to three countries:

REPUBLIC OF KOREA    Economic Development of Korea: Sui Generis or Generic?-- Reflections on the Studies of the Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 1945-1975, AID Discussion Paper (Draft), by David I. Steinberg, PPC, 3 May 1981. (An interpretive review of a multi-volume study of Korean development by Harvard University and Korea Development Institute.)

"Development Lessons from the Korean Experience - The Harvard-Korea Development Institute Studies of Korean Modernization," Journal of Asian Studies, by David I Steinberg, September 1981.

PAKISTAN    A Review of United States Development Assistance to Pakistan, 1952-1980, prepared by Jeffalyn Johnson and Associates, for AID/Washington, 1981.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA    Evaluation of U.S. Economic Aid to Free China, 1951-1965, AID Discussion Paper No. 11, by Neil H. Jacoby, January 1966.

The aim of our research into the country reviews was to uncover relevant data that would corroborate or dispute our DS/DIU findings, or would expand upon them in other ways.

That the report on Pakistan had a chapter titled "Development Assistance and Institution Building" while the Korean and Taiwan reports scarcely mentioned institution building turned out to be beside the point. In the case of all three countries, we found that although the reviews provide much valuable information on what can be called the macro end of the spectrum -- i.e., they concentrate on program planning and policy issues on the overall country scale, rather than the individual project scale (although all review specific projects), and on political and cultural considerations -- their broad focus of attention made them only tangentially useful for our rather narrow purpose.

Where their findings, conclusions and recommendations could be related to micro project design, we found, without exception, echoes of points made by evaluators and auditors.

## Appendix D.

### 159 A.I.D. Institution-Building Projects in Five Key Clusters, whose Designs, Evaluations and Audits have been Abstracted by DS/DIU (Cluster shown in parentheses)

- 2630061 - Development Planning Studies, Egypt (II)
- 2630065 - Urban Low Cost Health Delivery, Egypt (V)
- 2680309 - Vocational Training Program, YMCA/PVO, Lebanon (IV)
- 2760002 - English Language Training, Syria (II)
- 2760020 - Soil Survey/Land Classification, Syria (II)
- 2770398 - National Education Research Planning, Turkey (I)
- 2770426 - On-Farm Water Management, Turkey (I)
- 2770597 - Bosphorus University, Turkey (V)
- 2780186 - Jordan Valley Farmers Association, Jordan (III)
- 2790017 - Taiz Water Rehabilitation, Yemen (I)
- 2790024 - Tropical Fruit Improvement, Yemen (II)
- 2790030 - Sorghum and Millet Crop Improvement, Yemen (II)
- 3060080 - Economic Planning, Afghanistan (I)
- 3060090 - Helmand-Arghandab Valley Development, Afghanistan (V)
- 3060091 - Elementary and Secondary Education, Afghanistan (I)
- 3060102 - HAVA/HACU Equipment, Afghanistan (V)
- 3060121 - Higher Education, Kabul University, Afghanistan (V)
- 3060129 - Fertilizer Distribution, Afghanistan (I)
- 3060142 - Rural Primary Schools, Phase I, Afghanistan (I)
- 3060146 - Central Helmand Drainage I, Afghanistan (V)
- 3670054 - Food Grain Technology, Nepal (I)
- 3670096 - Family Planning, Nepal (I)
- 3670102 - Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science, Nepal (I)
- 3670115 - Malaria Control, Nepal (I)
- 3670210 - Western Hills Penetration Road, Nepal (I)
- 3670228 - Teacher and Material Utilization, Nepal (I)
- 3860150 - Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, India (V)
- 3860368 - Soil and Water Management, India (V)
- 3860379 - Rice Research Improvement, India (V)
- 3880031 - Project Improvement, Grant I, Bangladesh (I)
- 4920233 - Water Resources Development, Philippines (I)
- 4920236 - Provincial Development, Philippines (V)
- 4920252 - Food and Nutrition, Philippines (II)
- 4920256 - Local Development Project, Philippines (V)
- 4920260 - Bicol River Basin Development, Philippines (V)
- 4920275 - Bicol Integrated Area Development, Philippines (V)
- 4920282 - Third Feasibility Study, Philippines (I)
- 4930195 - Labor Department Administration, Thailand (I)

Appendix D (continued)

- 4930233 - National Economic Policy and Planning, Thailand (I)
- 4930235 - Commodity Management, Thailand (I)
- 4930239 - Customs Improvement, Thailand (I)
- 4970236 - Assistance to Agr-Fisheries Dvpmt, Indonesia (V)
- 4970238 - Area Development Project Planning, Indonesia (V)
- 4970246 - Northern Sumatra Regional Planning, Indonesia (V)
- 4970276 - Provincial Area Development Program II, Indonesia (V)
- 5040039 - Diversification and Dvpmt of Agriculture, Guyana (V)
- 5040053 - Tax Administration, Guyana (I)
- 5040060 - Public Sector Manpower Training, Guyana (I)
- 5040067 - Leprosy Control (OPG), Guyana (IV)
- 5040068 - Rural Feeder Roads, Guyana (I)
- 5110049 - Credit Unions, Bolivia (IV)
- 5110452 - Small Farmer Organizations, Bolivia (IV)
- 5110457 - Rural Access Roads, Bolivia (I)
- 5110466 - Rural Roads II, Bolivia (I)
- 5110468 - National Nutrition Improvement (II)
- 5110482 - National Community Dvpmt Program, Bolivia (V)
- 5110534 - Rural Electrification Management, Bolivia (V)
- 5120240 - Sao Paulo Highway Construction, Brazil (V)
- 5120249 - Rural Rehabilitation and Reform, Brazil (V)
- 5120278 - Eletrobras Power Trng and Tech Assistance, Brazil (I)
- 5120283 - Agricultural Research, Brazil (I)
- 5120294 - Rural Road Construction Loan, Brazil (I)
- 5130208 - Health Services Administration, Chile (I)
- 5130237 - Population Dynamics, Chile (I)
- 5130310 - Mapuche Livestock Dvpmt, PVO/OPG, Chile (III)
- 5140197 - Nutrition Planning, Colombia (II)
- 5140210 - Integrated Rural Development, OPG, Colombia (V)
- 5150118 - Municipal Development, Costa Rica (II)
- 5150140 - Overseas Education Fund, PVO/OPG, Costa Rica (IV)
- 5150142 - Conservation Education, Costa Rica (IV)
- 5170059 - Agricultural Development, Dominican Republic (I)
- 5170104 - Educational Credit, Dominican Republic (IV)
- 5170106 - Private Development Finance Company II, Dominican Republic (IV)
- 5170108 - Non-Formal Home Study, Secondary, Dominican Republic (I)
- 5180001 - Vocational Educ-Employment Generation OPG, Ecuador (III)
- 5180092 - Leadership Training, Ecuador (II)
- 5180096 - Institutional Development, Local, Ecuador (III)
- 5180112 - Family Food and Nutrition, Ecuador (I)
- 5190171 - National Cadastre, El Salvador (I)
- 5190197 - Small Enterprise Development, PVO/OPG, El Salvador (III)
- 5200230 - Rural Health System Evaluation, Guatemala (I)
- 5200232 - Food Pdn and Nutritional Improvement, Guatemala (I)
- 5210061 - Community Development Health (HACHO), Haiti (V)
- 5210063 - Highway Maintenance, Haiti (I)
- 5210069 - Agricultural Development Report, Haiti (I)

# Appendix D (continued)

- 5210070 - Communicable Disease Control, Haiti (I)
- 5210073 - Small Farmer Development, Haiti (III)
- 5210074 - Agricultural Feeder Roads, Haiti (I)
- 5210084 - Road Maintenance II, Haiti (I)
- 5210086 - Strengthening Health Services II, Haiti (I)
- 5220083 - Labor Education and Social Development, Honduras (III)
- 5220108 - Non-Formal Rural Education, Honduras (II)
- 5220112 - Savings and Loan Institution, Honduras (II)
- 5220124 - Nutrition/SAPLAN, Honduras (II)
- 5220133 - Rural Construction II, Honduras (I)
- 5240047 - Community Development, Nicaragua (IV)
- 5240072 - National Family Planning System (II)
- 5240118 - Rural Development Sector Loan/Invierno, Nicaragua (II)
- 5240156 - Diversification of Funde, Nicaragua (I)
- 5250069 - Private Enterprise Development, Panama (I)
- 5250173 - Cooperative Development, Panama (I)
- 5250192 - Access Roads, Panama (I)
- 5260018 - Tax Administration, Paraguay (I)
- 5260050 - Agricultural Institutional Development, Paraguay (I)
- 5260101 - Small Farmer Credit Unions/DAPC, Paraguay (II)
- 5260122 - Credit Union Financial Stabilization OPG, Paraguay (III)
- 5260501 - Rural Non-Formal Education, Paraguay (I)
- 5260502 - Rural Radio Education, Paraguay (I)
- 5260801 - Municipal Development/IDM, Paraguay (V)
- 5260802 - Private Development Bank/COMDESA, Paraguay (IV)
- 5270155 - Agricultural Cooperative Federations, Peru (I)
- 5270156 - Improved Feeding Capability OPG/CARITAS, Peru (III)
- 5270161 - Vocational Training OPG/Pueblos Jovenes, Peru (III)
- 5270204 - Rural Leadership Training for Women OPG/ACOMUC, Peru (III)
- 5270205 - Expanded Urban Food for Work Program OPG/SAWS, Peru (III)
- 5270209 - Legal/Social Services for Urban Women, Peru (III)
- 5280100 - Revolving Loan Fund for Community Farms, Uruguay (III)
- 5280101 - Agricultural Research/Technical Assistance, Uruguay (I)
- 5280102 - Agricultural Cooperative/CALFORU, Uruguay (IV)
- 5280106 - Credit Union Development OPG/FUCAC, Uruguay (III)
- 5320009 - Rural Education Sector Loan, Jamaica (I)
- 5320038 - Forestry/Inland Fisheries Development, Jamaica (I)
- 5320061 - Agricultural Planning, Jamaica (I)
- 6080109 - Demographic Research Center/Poplab, Morocco (II)
- 6080131 - Dry Land Farming, Morocco (I)
- 6080141 - Nutrition Education/CRS Phase II, Morocco (III)
- 6150141 - Population Dynamics, Kenya (II)
- 6150147 - Rural Development-Vihiga, Kenya (III)
- 6150180 - Drylands Cropping Systems Research, Kenya (I)
- 6200602 - Professional and Higher Education, Nigeria (IV)
- 6200714 - Indigenous Industrial Development, Nigeria (III) (IV)
- 6200768 - Agricultural Economics and Marketing, Manr State, Nigeria
- 6200773 - Soil and Water Conservation, Northern Nigeria (IV)

## Appendix D (continued)

- 6200817 - Ahmadu University Veterinary Medicine Faculty, Nigeria (III)
- 6210117 - Agricultural Credit, Tanzania (I)
- 6210135 - Agricultural Education and Extension, Tanzania (IV)
- 6250530 - Federal Advanced School of Agriculture/FASA,  
Central and West Africa Regional (IV)
- 6250805 - Road Maintenance/CERFER, Central and W. Africa Regional (I)
- 6310009 - Practical Training in Health Education, Cameroon (II)
- 6320048 - Land and Water Resource Development, Lesotho (I)
- 6330056 - Crop Production, Botswana (I)
- 6330067 - Agricultural Planning, Botswana (I)
- 6330212 - Rural Enterprise Expansion Service OPG, Botswana (III)
- 6410055 - Danfa Rural Health Family Plan, Ghana (IV)
- 6410070 - Agriculture Management Development, Ghana (I)
- 6450035 - Southern Africa Development Personnel  
and Training, Swaziland (I)
- 6490038 - Agricultural Services, Somalia (II)
- 6600052 - Agricultural Economic Development, Zaire (II)
- 6600058 - Endemic/Communicable Disease Control, Zaire (II)
- 6630003 - Gondar Public Health College, Ethiopia (IV)
- 6630166 - Pulse Diversification and Improvement, Ethiopia (II)
- 6630210 - Southern Gemu Gofa Area Rehabilitation, Ethiopia (IV)
- 6640237 - Agricultural Economic Research & Planning, Tunisia (I)
- 6640255 - Institute of Nutrition & Food Technology, Tunisia (II)
- 6690071 - Geological Survey and Appraisal, Liberia (IV)
- 6690122 - Institute of Public Administration, Liberia (IV)
- 6850235 - Cereals Production Project II, Senegal, (I)
- 6980404 - Social Science Research, Africa Regional (I)

## Appendix E

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agency for International Development, Proceedings - Conference on Institution Building and Technical Assistance, sponsored by the Agency for International Development and Committee on Institutional Cooperation, Washington DC, 4-5 December 1969.

Allen, Mary Beth and Molly Hageboeck, "Evaluating Cooperative Development Projects," A Review of Project Designs and their Implicit Requirements for Evaluation, AID/PPC/E/PES, Washington, DC, 29 September 1981.

Axinn, George, "Field Testing the Model," Proceedings - Conference on Institution Building and Technical Assistance, sponsored by AID and CIC, Washington DC, 4-5 December 1969.

Blase, Melvin G., Institution Building: A Source Book, Final Report, Contract No. AID/csd-3392, AID/Washington, 1973.

Checchi and Company, Intercountry Evaluation of Municipal Development Programs and Institutions in Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Venezuela, A Program Evaluation Study, AID/Bureau for Latin America, Washington DC, October 1975.

Crawford, Paul R., Implementation Issues in Integrated Rural Development: A Review of 21 USAID Projects, IRD Research Note No. 2 for AID/DS/RAD, Development Alternatives, Inc., Washington DC, 4 May 1981.

DEVRES, The Socio-Economic Context of Fuelwood Use in Small Rural Communities, AID Evaluation Special Study No. 1, Contract No. AID/SOD/PDC-C-0187, Washington DC, August 1980.

Dimond, Frank, "Evaluating Cooperative Development Projects," memorandum to Molly Hageboeck and Mary Beth Allen, AFR/DP/PPE, 21 October 1981.

Duncan, Richard L., Institution Building - Incidents, Ideas and Applications, An Experimental Guidebook in Scholar-Practitioner Communication, Final Report Contract No. AID/ta-c-1069, AID/Washington, 25 March 1975.

Esman, Milton J. "Institution Building as a Guide to Action," Proceedings - Conference on Institution Building and Technical Assistance, sponsored by AID and CIC, Washington DC, 4-5 December 1969.



Gilmore, Judith, et al., Morocco: Food Aid and Nutrition Education, AID Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 8, AID/Washington, August 1980.

Hansen, Gary, "Some Initial Thoughts on Institutional Development," AID/PPC/PDPR, Washington DC, 26 August 1981.

Honadle, George H., Fishing for Sustainability: The Role of Capacity Building in Development Administration, IRD Working Paper No. 8 for AID/DS/RAD, Development Alternatives, Inc., Washington DC, June 1981.

Hutchinson, Edmund, et al., Intercountry Evaluation of Education Sector Programs in Brazil, Colombia and Panama, A Program Evaluation Study, AID/Bureau for Latin America, Washington DC, December 1976

\_\_\_\_\_, Intercountry Evaluation of Agriculture Sector Programs in Colombia, Costa Rica and Guatemala, "Volume 1, Summary Report," A Program Evaluation Study, AID/Bureau for Latin America, Washington DC, June 1974.

Jacoby, Neil H., Evaluation of U.S. Economic Aid to Free China, 1951-1965, AID Discussion Paper No. 11, AID/Washington, January 1966.

Jeffalyn Johnson and Associates, Inc., A Review of United States Development Assistance to Pakistan, 1952-1980, AID/Washington, 1981.

Johnson, Charles W., et al., Kitale Maize: The Limits of Success, AID Project Impact Evaluation Report No. 2, AID/Washington, December 1979.

Korten, David C., "Management of Social Transformation at National and Sub-National Levels," Discussion Draft, for Asian Institute of Management and the Ford Foundation, 24 March 1981.

\_\_\_\_\_, "Rural Development Programming: The Learning Process Approach," Rural Development Participation Review, Winter 1981, Cornell University, Ithaca NY.

Morss, Elliott R., and Christopher W. Nordlinger, "Sustaining Project Benefits," First Draft, for PPC/E/PES, Development Alternatives Inc., Washington DC, October 1981.

Morss, Victoria, "Analysis of the Special Problems of Projects with Significant Implementation Problems," An Examination of Evaluation Findings and Lessons, for PPC/E/PES, Contract No. AID/OTR-0085-0-00-1170-00, Washington DC, undated first draft, 1981.

Practical Concepts Inc., Evaluation of AID/Morocco Assistance to Hassan II Institute of Agronomy and Veterinary Science, Final Report, Contract N. AID/CM-C-73-200, W.O. 15, Washington DC, May 1975.

\_\_\_\_\_, The P/C/I Model for Assessing Organizational Viability, "Volume II - Development of the Model," Contract AID/C-otr-C-73-200, W.O. 2, Washington DC, 10 December 1974.

Steinberg, David I., "Development Lessons from the Korean Experience - The Harvard-Korea Development Institute Studies of Korean Modernization," Revised, Journal of Asian Studies, September 1981.

\_\_\_\_\_, The Economic Development of Korea: Sui Generis or Generic?, Reflections on the Studies of the Modernization of the Republic of Korea, 1945-1975, AID Discussion Paper (Draft), AID/PPC, Washington DC, 3 May 1981.

Tendler, Judith, Intercountry Evaluation of Small Farmer Organizations in Ecuador and Honduras, A Program Evaluation Study, AID/Bureau for Latin America, Washington DC, November 1976.

United Nations Development Programme, Evaluation Study No. 1, Comprehensive Development Planning, Report on the Joint UN/IBRD/UNDP Evaluation Study on UNDP-Financed Technical Cooperation in Comprehensive Development Planning, United Nations NY, June 1979.

Wolgin, Jerome, "AID Policy Toward the Recurrent Cost Problems in Less Developed Countries," AID/PPC/PDPR/ED, Washington DC, 24 July 1981.

World Bank, "The World Bank and Institutional Development - Experience and Directions for Future Work," Projects Advisory Staff, Washington DC, 12 May 1980.

## A.I.D. EVALUATION PUBLICATIONS

The following reports have been issued in the A.I.D. Evaluation Publication series. Those documents with an identification code (e.g., PN-AAG-585) may be ordered in microfiche and paper copy. Please direct inquiries regarding orders to:

Editor of ARDA, S&T/DIU/DI  
Bureau for Science and Technology  
Agency for International Development  
Washington, D.C. 20523  
U.S.A.

### PROGRAM EVALUATION DISCUSSION PAPERS

- No. 1: Reaching the Rural Poor: Indigenous Health Practitioners Are There Already (March 1979) PN-AAG-685
- No. 2: New Directions Rural Roads (March 1979) PN-AGG-670
- No. 3: Rural Electrification: Linkages and Justifications (April 1979) PN-AAG-671
- No. 4: Policy Directions for Rural Water Supply in Developing Countries (April 1979) PN-AAG-691
- No. 5: Study of Family Planning Program Effectiveness (April 1979) PN-AAG-672
- No. 6: The Sociology of Pastoralism and African Livestock Development (May 1979) PN-AAG-922
- No. 7: Socio-Economic and Environmental Impacts of Low-Volume Rural Roads -- A Review of the Literature (February 1980) PN-AAJ-135
- No. 8: Assessing the Impact of Development Projects on Women (May 1980) PN-AAH-725
- No. 9: The Impact of Irrigation on Development: Issues for a Comprehensive Evaluation Study (October 1980)
- No. 10: A Review of Issues in Nutrition Program Evaluation (July 1981) PN-AAJ-174
- No. 11: Effective Institution Building: A Guide for Project Designers and Project Managers Based on Lessons Learned from the AID Portfolio (March, 1982) PN-AAJ-611

### EVALUATION REPORTS

#### PROGRAM EVALUATIONS:

- No. 1: Family Planning Program Effectiveness: Report of a Workshop (December 1979)
- No. 2: A.I.D.'s Role in Indonesian Family Planning: A Case Study with General Lessons for Foreign Assistance (December 1979) PN-AAH-425
- No. 3: Third Evaluation of the Thailand National Family Planning Program (February 1980) PN-AAH-006
- No. 4: The Workshop on Pastoralism and African Livestock Development (June 1980) PN-AAH-238
- No. 5: Rural Roads Evaluation Summary Report (February 1982) PN-AAJ-607

## PROJECT IMPACT EVALUATIONS

- No. 1: Colombia: Small Farmer Market Access (December 1979)  
PN-AAH-768
- No. 2: Kitale Maize: The Limits of Success (May 1980)  
PN-AAH-723
- No. 3: The Potable Water Project in Rural Thailand (May 1980)  
PN-AAH-850
- No. 4: Philippine Small Scale Irrigation (May 1980) PN-AAH-749
- No. 5: Kenya Rural Water Supply: Program, Progress, Prospects  
(June 1980) PN-AAH-724
- No. 6: Impact of Rural Roads in Liberia (June 1980) PN-AAH-750
- No. 7: Effectiveness and Impact of the CARE/Sierra Leone Rural  
Penetration Roads Projects (June 1980) PN-AAH-751
- No. 8: Morocco: Food Aid and Nutrition Education (August 1980)  
PN-AAH-851
- No. 9: Senegal: The Sine Saloum Rural Health Care Project  
(October 1980) PN-AAJ-008
- No. 10: Tunisia: CARE Water Projects (October 1980)
- No. 11: Jamaica Feeder Roads: An Evaluation (November 1980)
- No. 12: Korean Irrigation (December 1980)
- No. 13: Rural Roads in Thailand (December 1980) PN-AAH-970
- No. 14: Central America: Small Farmer Cropping Systems  
(December 1980) PN-AAH-977
- No. 15: The Philippines: Rural Electrification (December 1980)  
PN-AAH-975
- No. 16: Bolivia: Rural Electrification (December 1980)  
PN-AAH-978
- No. 17: Honduras Rural Roads: Old Directions and New  
(January 1981) PN-AAH-971
- No. 18: Philippines Rural Roads I and II (March 1981)  
PN-AAH-973
- No. 19: U.S. Aid to Education in Nepal: A 20-Year Beginning  
(May 1981) PN-AAJ-168
- No. 20: Korean Potable Water System Project: Lessons from  
Experience (May 1981) PN-AAJ-170
- No. 21: Ecuador: Rural Electrification (June 1981) PN-AAH-979
- No. 22: The Product is Progress: Rural Electrification in Costa Rica  
(October 1981) PN-AAJ-175
- No. 23: Northern Nigeria Teacher Educational Project (Sept. 1981)  
PN-AAJ-173
- No. 24: Peru: CARE OPG Water Health Services Project (October 1981)  
PN-AAJ-176
- No. 25: Thailand: Rural NonFormal Education - The Mobile Trade  
Training Schools (October 1981) PN-AAJ-171
- No. 26: Kenya: Rural Roads (January 1982) PN-AAH-972
- No. 27: Korean Agricultural Research: The Integration of Research and  
Extension (January 1982) PN-AAJ-606
- No. 28: Philippines: Bicol Integrated Area Development (January 1982)  
PN-AAJ-179
- No. 29: Sederhana: Indonesia Small-Scale Irrigation (February 1982)  
PN-AAJ-608

- No. 30: Guatemala: Development of ICTA and Its Impact on Agricultural Research and Farm Productivity (February 1982) PN-AAJ-178  
No. 31: Sudan: The Rahad Irrigation Project (March 1982) PN-AAJ-610

#### SPECIAL STUDIES

- No. 1: The Socio-Economic Context of Fuelwood Use in Small Rural Communities (August 1980) PN-AAH-747  
No. 2: Water Supply and Diarrhea: Guatemala Revisited (August 1980) PN-AAJ-007  
No. 3: Rural Water Projects in Tanzania: Technical, Social, and Administrative Issues (November 1980) PN-AAH-974  
No. 4: The Social Impact of Agribusiness: A Case Study of ALCOSA in Guatemala (July 1981) PN-AAJ-172  
No. 5: Korean Elementary - Middle School Pilot Project (October 1981) PN-AAJ-169  
No. 6: The Economic Development of Korea: Sui Generis or Generic? (January 1982) PN-AAJ-177

#### PROGRAM DESIGN AND EVALUATION METHODS

Manager's Guide to Data Collection (November 1979) PN-AAH-434

Directory of Central Evaluation Authorities (April 1981)  
(distribution restricted to official agencies)